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“Nothing succeeds like success . . ..”1
I. INTRODUCTION2
A government’s imposition of involuntary3 taxes on its sub-
jects can have an incendiary impact on its subjects’ reaction to
such taxes.4  This is the case in both the U.S.5 as well as in the
Commonwealth Caribbean.6  It is therefore every politician’s quest
1. See E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 73 (Harper & Row 1973)
[hereinafter SCHUMACHER].
2. V.S. NAIPAUL, THE MIMIC MEN 152 (Andre Deutsch 1967) [hereinafter
NAIPAUL: THE MIMIC MEN] (“Success is success; once it occurs it explains itself.”)
(emphasis added); see also NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 130 (George Bull
Trans., Penguin Books 1961) (“Many have held and hold the opinion that events are
controlled by fortune . . . .”) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., A Summary of the 1765 Stamp Act, THE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG
FOUNDATION (2012), http://www.history.org/history/teaching/tchcrsta.cfm (“[W]hat
made the [1765 Stamp Act] so offensive to the colonists was not so much its immediate
cost but the standard it seemed to set. In the past, taxes and duties on colonial trade
had always been viewed as measures to regulate commerce, not to raise money. The
Stamp Act, however, was viewed as a direct attempt by England to raise money in the
colonies without the approval of the colonial legislatures.”) (emphasis added); see also
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776 at 11 (Simon & Schuster 2005) [hereinafter MCCULLOUGH:
1776] (Indeed, the “seiz[ure of] the public revenue” was a critical condemnation of the
American “rebellion” – that culminated in American Independence in 1776 - by King
George III in his historical address at the opening of the British Parliament in
October 1775). See also id. at 67-8 (“On . . . January 1, 1776, the first copies of the
speech delivered by King George III at the opening of Parliament back in October
. . .arrived with the ships from London. . . . The speech . . . [with i]ts charges of
traitorous rebellion . . . ended any hope of reconciliation . . . . ”).
4. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65 (Simon & Schuster 2005)
[hereinafter MCCULLOUGH: JOHN ADAMS] (“[I]n 1768 . . .[the imposition of yet] another
round of taxes . . . by [the British] Parliament . . . [caused] the atmosphere in the city
[of Boston to] turn . . . incendiary. Incidents of violence broke out between the
townsmen and soldiers . . . .  In the melee the soldiers suddenly opened fire . . . killing
five men.”) (emphasis added).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 121 (Andre Deutsch 1944)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS: CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY] (“The Stamp Act was as unpopular
with the merchants of the islands as it was on the mainland; the stamps were publicly
burnt, to the accompaniment of shouts of liberty.  “God only knows,” wrote Pinney
from Nevis as soon as hostilities broke out, “what will become of us.  We must either
starve or be ruined.”  It was worse.  They did both. Fifteen thousand slaves died of
famine in Jamaica alone between 1780 and 1787, and American independence was
the first stage in the decline of the sugar colonies.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted); see also MCCULLOUGH: 1776 at 13 (referring to the Stamp Act of 1765 as
“incendiary”).Opposition to involuntary taxation is as old as history itself. See, e.g.,
WILLIAMS: CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY at 153 (“In 1832 the Trinidad Council petitioned
for the abolition of the slave tax of one pound island currency per head.  The [British]
Colonial Office refused:  it was “of great importance that this tax should be continued
. . . .”) (citations omitted).
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for the holy grail of a perfect tax-substitute7 source of governmen-
tal revenue.8  As a result, lotteries9 have become a modern-day
Midas10 for governmental use11 in this regard.  In fact, lotteries
currently provide purportedly “painless”12 tax-substitute13 sources
of revenue for governments14 in the U.S.15 as well as the Common-
7. See, e.g., BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 47 (MJF
Books 1990) [hereinafter GOLDWATER] (“Where is the politician who has not promised
his constituents a fight to the death for lower taxes . . . .”) (emphasis added).
8. See Lotteries, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 1-17 at 11, http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/research/lotteries.html (last revised Aug. 3, 1999)
[hereinafter NGISC: Lotteries] (“The most important issue regarding lotteries is the
ability of government at any level to manage [this] activity from which it profits.  In
an anti-tax era, many state governments have become dependent on “painless” lottery
revenues . . . .”) (emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 7 (2013); see, e.g., Lee v. City of Miami,
163 So. 486, 488 (1935) (“[A] typical legislative definition [of a lottery is] [a] scheme
for the distribution of property by chance, among persons who have paid or agreed to
pay a valuable consideration for the chance, whether called a lottery, raffle, or gift
enterprise, or by some other name.”) (citation omitted); see also Kathryn R.L. Rand,
Why State Law Matters: Indian Gaming and Intergovernmental Relations in
Wisconsin, in THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMBLING 169 (Kenneth N. Hansen &
Tracy A. Skopek  eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hansen & Skopek] (“[L]ottery . . . mean[s]
any game of chance involving the elements of prize, chance, and consideration.”)
(citation omitted); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE:
STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 51 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989) [hereinafter CLOTFELTER
& COOK: SELLING HOPE] (“The essence of a lottery is the purchase of a chance to win a
prize, based on a random drawing.”).
10. See, e.g., EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 279 (New American Library 1969)
[hereinafter HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY] (“Midas wished that whatever he touched would
turn into gold.”).
11. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 16 (“[G]ambling is a
worldwide activity that is supported by . . . official sanction.”) (emphasis added).
12. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (“[A]ccording to
proponents, the lottery . . . is a “painless tax” because it is paid only by the willing.”)
(emphasis added); see generally RICHARD MCGOWAN, STATE LOTTERIES AND LEGALIZED
GAMBLING: PAINLESS REVENUE OR PAINFUL MIRAGE 4 (Praeger1994) [hereinafter
MCGOWAN].
13. See Kevin Duncan, Alex Raut & Joseph Henchman, Fiscal Fact No. 295:
Lottery Tax Rates Vary Greatly by State, TAX FOUNDATION (Mar. 29, 2012), http://
taxfoundation.org/article/lottery-tax-rates-vary-greatly-state [hereinafter  Duncan,
Raut & Henchman] (“While no government labels its lottery as a tax . . . lottery
“profits” are an implicit tax.”) (emphasis added).
14. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“[In the U.S.] lotteries rank first
among the various forms of gambling in terms of gross revenues:  total lottery sales in
1996 totaled $42.9 billion.  1982 gross revenues were $4 billion, representing an
increase of 950% over the preceding 15 years, 1982-1996.”) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
15. See generally Stephen J. Leacock, Lotteries and Public Policy in American
Law, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 37 (2012) [hereinafter Leacock: Lotteries and Public
Policy]; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 3 (“[T]oday
three-fourths of the U.S. population lives in states where lotteries are not only legal
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wealth Caribbean.16  After all, lotteries constitute a voluntary17
rather than an involuntary tax.18  Moreover, winning lottery-jack-
pots may provide human drama for both the winners themselves
as well as the general public at large, “and drama was discovered
to be a necessary human nutriment.”19
Actually, in the U.S. lotteries serve as present day tax-
substitute financial vectors.20  In the Commonwealth Caribbean,
the pace is picking up as well.21  Unquestionably, public playing
of lotteries is widespread in the U.S.22 and in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean too.23  Lottery playing is both tena-
but provided by state government itself.  One after the other states have embraced
this form of public finance . . . .”) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, A REGIONAL STUDY
(Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1987), available at http://country
studies.us/caribbean-islands/2.htm (“The Commonwealth Caribbean is the term
applied to the English-speaking islands in the Caribbean and the mainland nations of
Belize (formerly British Honduras) and Guyana (formerly British Guiana) that once
constituted the Caribbean portion of the British Empire.”); see also Edward A. Laing,
Insularity and Success, 4 CARIB. L.B. 6 (1999) (“Turning now to economic concerns,
most of our [Commonwealth Caribbean] countries are middle income developing
countries.”); see also William C. Gilmore, The Associated States of the Commonwealth
Caribbean: The Constitutions and the Individual, 11 LAW. AM. 1, 1 n.3 (1979). Typical
abbreviations used for these territories are:  Antigua (Ant.), The Bahamas (Bah.),
Barbados (Bds.), Belize (Blz.), Bermuda (Berm.), the Cayman Islands (Cay.),
Dominica (Dom.), Grenada (Gren.), Guyana (Guy.), Jamaica (Jam.),  Montserrat
(Mont), St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla (KNA), St. Lucia (St.L.), St. Vincent (St.V.),
Trinidad & Tobago (TT), the Virgin Islands (Virgs.)(British). See also Stephen J.
Leacock, Essentials of Investor Protection in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the
United States, 6 LAW. AM. 662, 686 n.2 (1974).
17. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 215. .
18. See THE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUNDATION, supra note 3.
19. See NAIPAUL: THE MIMIC MEN, supra note 2, at 153.
20. See Duncan, Raut & Henchman, supra note 13.
21. See, e.g., History, THE BARBADOS LOTTERY, http://www.mybarbadoslottery.com/
pages/history (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“In 2005, GTECH introduced its newly-
developed Pick ’n Play games, which bring visibility to new and existing online games.
Today, more than 50 other gaming options have been developed for our growing
customer base.”).
22. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1  (“[Lottery playing] is the most
widespread form of gambling in the U.S.: lotteries operate in 37 states and the
District of Columbia.  It is the only form of commercial gambling which a majority of
adults report having played.”) (emphasis added); see also id. (“ ‘[P]laying the lottery, is
. . . potentially addictive . . . .’ ”).  Actually, lottery playing may be almost on par with
America’s almost addictive attraction to another activity (i.e.  alcohol ingestion); see,
e.g., Scott Schaeffer, The Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the Eighteenth
Amendment: Chicago and the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL. 385 (2011).
23. See, e.g., About Us, BETTING, GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION, http://www.
bglc.gov.jm/about/ (last modified Mar. 2009) (“The Betting Gaming & Lotteries
Commission is a statutory body established in 1975. under the provisions of the
Betting Gaming & Lotteries Act to regulate and control the operations of betting and
gaming and the conduct of lotteries in the island . . . .”) (emphasis added); see BETTING,
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cious24 and extraordinarily successful financially in the U.S.25 and
also in the Commonwealth Caribbean.26  As a result, both the
U.S.27 and Commonwealth Caribbean28 have enthusiastically
GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION, http://www.bglc.gov.jm/about/history.html (last
modified Mar. 2009) (“It would be wishful thinking to imagine that Jamaica will be
immune to the gaming fever, which is taking place in [the U.S.]. The [Jamaica Betting,
Gaming & Lotteries] Commission has been receiving numerous applications from
U.S-based entities for lottery and gaming licences to operate in Jamaica.”) (emphasis
added); see, e.g., V.S. NAIPAUL, THE MIDDLE PASSAGE 50 (Andre Deutsch 1962) (“In . . .
1959 . . . in Trinidad . . . with more money circulating, gambling has become
universal.  It is respectable; it is almost an industry . . . .”).
24. This tenacity may be a function of a certain human frailty; see, e.g., State ex
rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 232 N.W.2d 120, 131 (Neb. 1975) (“[T]he self-
delusion to which even the best of men are sometimes susceptible.”) (emphasis added).
The tenacity may also be a function of “magical thinking.” See NGISC: Lotteries,
supra note 8, at 8. It may also be the case that the pain of repetitively losing - when
playing lotteries – is a necessary precondition to escaping the tenacity of self-delusion;
see, e.g., DAVID VISCOTT, EMOTIONAL RESILIENCE 80 (Harmony Books 1996) (“It is an
odd thing, but as much as you avoid pain, you need it to help you sort out your
experience.  “Pinch me so I know I’m not dreaming,” reflects how people use pain.
Slapping a person in hysterics can arrest the escalation of panic by focusing the
person on his physical hurt. The power of pain is that it brings you into the present.”)
(emphasis added); see also NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL
REPORT: PROBLEM & PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, Ch. 4 at 4-2, http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/ngisc/reports/4.pdf  (last revised Aug. 3, 1999) [hereinafter NGISC: FINAL
REPORT].
25. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“Lotteries rank first among the
various forms of gambling in terms of gross revenues: total lottery sales in 1996
totaled $42.9 billion. 1982 gross revenues were $4 billion, representing an increase of
950% over the preceding 15 years, 1982-1996.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
26. See, e.g., Gov’t Continues to Lapse on Deposit of Lotto Funds,
STARBOEKNEWS.COM (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/archives/04/
14/gov’t-continues-to-lapse-on-deposit-of-lotto-funds (“[F]rom 1996 to 2008, ‘amounts
totaling $3.283 billion were received from the Guyana Lotteries Company and
deposited into account No. 3119.’ At the end of 2008, the balance on this account was
$186.508 million, which meant that the government has so far spent $3.097 billion of
the money they received during the period in question.”); see also Lotteries Money
Paid into Consolidated Fund, STARBOEKNEWS.COM (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.
stabroeknews.com/2007/archives/03/14/lotteries-money-paid-into-consolidated-fund/
(“A sum of roughly $12M from the Guyana Lotteries Company was deposited in the
Consolidated Fund in December.”); see, e.g., Barbados Lottery, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbados_lottery (last modified Apr. 16, 2012, 8:10 PM) (“The
Barbados lottery is the national lottery in Barbados. A high percentage of proceeds of
the Lottery’s revenue goes to support Beneficiary organizations . . . in accordance with
its mandate[.]”); see also History of Lottery, THE CARIBBEAN LOTTERY, http://www.the
caribbeanlottery.com/pages/history (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (“Today, more than 50
other gaming options have been developed for our growing customer base.”); see also
BETTING, GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION, supra note 23.
27. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1.
28. See Gov’t Continues to Lapse on Deposit of Lotto Funds, supra note 26. This is
not to say that the Commonwealth Caribbean consists of “mimic men of the New
World . . . .”; see NAIPAUL: THE MIMIC MEN, supra note 2, at 175.
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embraced this financial evolution in lottery use.29
Additionally, in the U.S., public policy30 has played a tran-
scendent role in both the state31 and federal judiciary’s32 fidelity to
constitutional mandates requiring scrupulous adherence to valid
legal use of state and federal judicial machinery.33  The Common-
wealth Caribbean’s experience in creating, articulating and apply-
ing public policy to lotteries is more truncated34 than the U.S.
experience, because the U.S. earned its independence from Great
Britain by force of arms in 1776.35  The U.S. therefore has almost
29. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8.
30. See Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994) (“The existence of . . .
public policy may be discerned by the . . . judiciary based on sources such as the
Constitutions of [the pertinent State] and the United States, legislation,
administrative rules and regulations, and the common law.”); see, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
The Limits of Judicial Independence,  25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 25, 59-60 (Fall
1993) (“[T]he very nature of the judicial function and the obligation of the judges [are]
to decide what is just, not to choose the best [politically popular] policy nor the course
of action most desired by the public.”) (emphasis added); see also BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1963) [hereinafter CARDOZO]; see
also Hon. Robert F. Brachtenbach, Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GONZ. L.
REV. 1 (1985/86) [hereinafter Brachtenbach]; see also W.S.M. Knight, Public Policy in
English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207 (1922).
31. See Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994); see also U.S. v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993) (“While lotteries have existed in this
country since its founding, States have long viewed them as a hazard to their citizens
and to the public interest, and have long engaged in legislative efforts to control this
form of gambling.”) (emphasis added); see also Leacock: Lotteries and Public Policy,
supra note 15.
32. To the degree permitted by the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993) (“Congress has, since the early 19th
century, sought to assist the States in controlling lotteries.”) (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[P]ublic
policy . . . is to deny use of judicial process to those who would undermine laws meant
to prevent gambling by using the courts to collect on gambling debts.”) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); see also infra note 516;. see, e.g., Hansen & Skopek, supra
note 9, at 165 (“State courts have been asked to answer important questions related to
separation of powers and other dimensions of state constitutional law and public
policy.”).
34. See, e.g., ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, A REGIONAL STUDY 387
(Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1987), available at http://
countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/83.htm (“British control over Barbados lasted
from 1625 until independence in 1966.”); see, e.g., ERIC WILLIAMS, DOCUMENTS OF
WEST INDIAN HISTORY VOL. I, 1492 - 1655, 300-304 (PNM P1963) (It appears that
early efforts made by Lord Willoughby and the Legislature of Barbados to procure
independence in 1651 from Great Britain and later efforts by others in 1652 to ensure
that two representatives from the island should be chosen to sit and vote in the
English Parliament did not come to fruition.).
35. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (Simon &
Schuster 1978) (“In 1776, the colonies declared themselves independent. The bitter
war that followed ended in an American victory.”) (emphasis added); see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 146 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003)
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two centuries of additional judicial experience in interpreting and
articulating the application of public policy to lotteries in this
regard.36
It is therefore quite rational that the U.S. judicial experience
in shaping its public policy would also serve as an emphatic
blueprint for emulation by the Commonwealth Caribbean territo-
ries.37  The U.S. experience in developing and applying public pol-
icy concepts and principles to lotteries should and would arguably
be followed by the courts in the Commonwealth Caribbean wher-
ever rational and convincing to do so.38
Indeed, public policy39 is fundamental to common law40 juris-
dictions as a whole.41  However, it is a hearty challenge for the
judiciary to interpret and apply it in any given case.42  This has
triggered its analogy to an “unruly horse.”43  Its nature44 is cer-
(“Distance and estrangement from Britain had fostered self-government . . .
democratic republicanism emerged as the default solution to the problem of how
America would be governed after the break with Britain.”) (emphasis added).
36. The Commonwealth Caribbean territories only achieved Independence, by
agreement and negotiation, from Great Britain beginning with Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago in 1962; see, e.g., Francis R. Alexis, The Basis of Judicial Review of
Legislation in the New Commonwealth and the United States of America: A
Comparative Analysis, 7 LAW. AM. 567, 591 n.2 (1975). Nevertheless, see David
Simmons, C.J. of Barbados, Aspects of Judicial Independence and Accountability –
Lessons for the Commonwealth Caribbean? 33 Commonwealth L.B. 657, 670 (2007)
(“It is for the judiciary and the legal profession to guard the independence of the
judiciary jealously . . . .”).
37. It has done so before in another context; see, e.g., Stephen J. Leacock, Public
Utility Regulation in a Developing Country, 8 LAW. AM. 338, 339 (1976) [hereinafter
Leacock: Public Utility Regulation] (“In search of guidance the [Public Utilities] Board
looked to United States . . . utility regulation decisions and drew on these in coming to
its own conclusions.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
38. See Leacock: Public Utility Regulation, supra note 37.
39. See Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994).
40. See Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 535 (Mass. 1807) (“[T]he
common law of England . . . and . . . the statutes . . . amending or altering it . . . may
be considered as forming the body of the common law of Massachusetts [subject to]
alterations by . . . provincial and state legislatures, and by the provisions of [the
Massachusetts] constitution.”) (emphasis in original). The common law of each of the
forty-nine common law jurisdictions in the U.S. (Louisiana law is significantly
impacted by Civil Law) may be defined similarly.
41. See Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at 1 (“For centuries, the principle of public
policy has played a vital role in dispute resolution.”).
42. See Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 672-73
(Tex. 2008) (“According to the well-known dictum of an English judge, public policy is
a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will
carry you.”) (emphasis added).
43. Id; see also Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, ¶15, 257
P.3d 1049, 1053.
44. See Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778, 785 (Md.
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tainly “protean.”45  Therefore, its categorization and subsequent
application in any given case when contrasted with its use in any
other case can display almost infinite change in the hands of the
judiciary.46
Of course, these characteristics may seem to suggest that
public policy is amorphous,47  which is not necessarily the case.
The reality is that public policy principles are most essentially a
function of the state law of each of the fifty individual states of the
U.S.,48 rather than being a monopoly of Federal law.  In this sense,
each one of the fifty states is indeed the “master of its own
house.”49  Arguably, the same observation is valid for the Com-
monwealth Caribbean states as well.50  In the arena of public pol-
icy, each state must navigate the interplay between the judiciary
and the legislature as two of the three coequal branches of
government.51
However, the search for answers to the question of the degree
1896) (“No exact definition of public policy has ever been given or can be found.”)
(emphasis added); see also Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at 2
45. See Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ¶10, 175 P.3d 560, 563 (“To
pluck a principle of public policy from the text of a statute and to ground a decision of
this court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief. Like its cousin legislative
history, public policy is a protean substance . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also
HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 38 (“Proteus . . . had the power . . . of
changing his shape at will.”).
46. See Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at 17 (“Courts need to [more] sharply define
the policy being invoked:  What is the precise principle upon which the policy is
based?”) (emphasis added).
47. See Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, ¶15l; see also Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at
17; 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§12.2 (4th ed. 2013) (“[P]ublic policy is, by its nature, variable with time and place
and, except in broad pronouncements, relies little on stare decisis.”) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
48. See Brachtenbach, supra note 30 at 2; see also Meyer v. Hawkinson, 2001 ND
78, ¶56, 626 N.W.2d 262, 275  (Sandstrom, J, dissenting) (“[A state’s] public policy
applies neither extraterritorially, nor . . . internationally.”) (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in English Common Law, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 70, 102 (1928-29) (“It has been urged with some acidity that a state legislature
is a better judge of its own “public policy” than the Supreme Court is likely to be.”)
(emphasis added).  As such, public policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean would be
the purview of each individual territory of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
50. See, e.g.,  Ezra Alleyne, The Developing Framework of the CSME:  Two Legal
Issues Considered, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 56 (2004) [hereinafter: Alleyne:
Developing Framework] (referring in a different context to the desire of the
Commonwealth Caribbean’s judiciary “to chart its own course in jurisprudence.”); see
also Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice:  The Sunset
of British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 197, 226 (2005) (assessing Caribbean judicial aspirations in a different context
as a “quest for self-determination.”).
51. The executive is the third branch. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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of social and economic impact of legalized gambling on states is
not an easy one.52  In the U.S., widespread public playing of lotter-
ies led to the creation by Congress53 of the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission (NGISC).54  This Commission referred
to the role of “magical thinking,”55 cited by two distinguished com-
mentators in published work,56 in increasing and intensifying lot-
tery playing.57  The two commentators seemed to have suggested
that through advertising, lottery advertisers seek to “target” this
“magical thinking”58 in efforts to create and stimulate ever-
increasing demand for lottery-playing.59  Arguably, this “magical
thinking”60 launches and exacerbates beliefs in the power of for-
tune to exert control over events in human life.61  Fortune’s per-
ceived control over events may be confirmed by the sheer numbers
of the present-day lottery-playing public.62
With respect to the legal status of lotteries in any given state
in the U.S., a number of alternative situations may exist.  For
52. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]he state faces an inherent conflict
in its desire to increase revenues and its duty to protect the public welfare.”).
53. See National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Message From the Chair,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/news/chairman.html (last visited September 21,
2013) ([hereinafter NGISC: Message From the Chair] (“The Commission was created
by the 104th Congress through Public Law 104169 . . . signed by President Clinton on
August 3, 1996. . .Specifically, the Commission [was] tasked with producing a
comprehensive and factual study of the social and economic impacts of legalized
gambling on states, tribes, communities and individuals.”).
54. See National Gambling Impact Study Commission, http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/ngisc/index.html (last visited September 21, 2013) [hereinafter NGISC]; see, e.g.,
supra note 23 (demonstrating that in Jamaica, the legislature moved beyond study
and created the Betting Gaming & Lotteries Commission in 1975 to regulate and
control lotteries in Jamaica).
55. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8 (“[L]ottery play depends on encouraging
people’s ‘magical thinking’. . . .”) (citation omitted); see also CLOTFELTER & COOK:
SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 71 (“[P]art of the answer to why people play [lotteries]
is suggested by evidence on how they play . . . . [T]he evidence on how they play
suggests that ancient superstitions and fallacious beliefs about numbers are still
thriving in this modern age . . . . [L]ottery agencies do nothing to educate the public on
these matters; if anything they seek to encourage magical thinking.”)
56. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 71.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 189.
60. Id. at 71. .
61. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 13.
62. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8 (“[The lottery] is the only form of
commercial gambling which a majority of adults report having played.”); see also
Charles T. Clotfelter, Philip J.Cook, Julie A. Edell, & Marian Moore, State Lotteries at
the Turn of the Century: Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission,
1, 3 (Duke Univ. 1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf
[hereinafter CLOTFELTER, COOK, EDELL & MOORE].
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example, the constitution of a particular state may be silent with
respect to lotteries.  Additionally, that particular state’s statutes
may also be silent with respect to lotteries.63  Another state’s con-
stitution alone may prohibit lotteries.64  Yet another state’s consti-
tution may be silent on lotteries, but the pertinent state may have
enacted a statute prohibiting lotteries.  Finally, both a state’s con-
stitution and a state statute may prohibit lotteries.65
These alternatives demonstrate that in the U.S., gambling
has been universally frowned upon.66  Outside of the U.S., “[a]s a
result of its unsavory reputation, restrictions on gambling have
been adopted by practically every country in the world throughout
history.”67  More specifically, with regard to lotteries, “for the first
six decades of [the twentieth] century every [American] state pro-
hibited lotteries.”68  Public policy’s disfavor of gambling69 repre-
sents the common law’s fundamental principle that the judiciary
will not enforce lottery agreements.70  This is the case because lot-
tery agreements are often illegal71 and therefore the parties to
such agreements may be equally at fault in making such agree-
ments.72  At common law, when parties have acted illegally and
additionally, such parties are equally at fault73—as parties to a
63. See e.g., Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1879).
64. Id; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 97-33-31 (West 2010).
65. See Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 858-859 (Ala.1984); see also Troy
Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 28 N.E.2d 207, 210-211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940) (citing
Ohio Const. Section 6 of Art. XV and Section13063 of the Ohio General Code].
66. See, e.g. Pritchet v. Insurance Co. of North America, 3 Yeates 458, 464 (Pa.
1803)  (“Every species of gaming contracts . . . are reprobated both by our law and
usage.”) (emphasis added); see also Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996); see also Joseph Kelly, Caught in the Intersection Between Public Policy
and Practicality:  A Survey of the Legal Treatment of Gambling-Related Obligations in
the United States, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 87, 90 (2002) [hereinafter: Kelly].
67. See McGowan, supra note 12, at 4; see also BETTING, GAMING & LOTTERIES
COMMISSION, http://www.bglc.gov.jm/about/history.html (last modified Mar. 2009),
supra note 23 (“[In Jamaica] [t]he Gambling Act of 1899 defined “unlawful
gambling”. . ..There were few places in Jamaica where public betting could legally
take place.”) (emphasis added).
68. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 235.
69. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884) (noting that “in this country, all





73. When parties have both acted illegally and are both at fault they can be said to
be in pari delicto. See Karel v. JRCK Corp., No. 304415, 2012 WL 1648871, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2012) (“[A]s between parties in pari delicto, [which means]
equally wrong, the law will not lend itself to afford relief to one as against the other,
but will leave them as it finds them.”).
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lottery agreement often are—a court will leave such parties to a
lottery agreement where it finds them.74
Historically, in the U.S., the legality of lotteries has been pen-
dulum-like.75  Successively, there has been state legalization76 fol-
lowed by state prohibition of public lottery play,77 followed by a
return to legality.78  The Commonwealth Caribbean experience is
not as extensive historically, because independence is a much
more recent legal and political phenomenon there.79  Nevertheless,
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the almost irresistible lure of
the apparent impulse to gamble is alive and well too.80  With
respect to the U.S., the modern era consists of a return to wide-
spread legality.81  The modern era in the Commonwealth Carib-
bean experience has been quite similar to that of the U.S.82  In
contrast to the legislative pendulum-like legality/illegality swings
in the U.S., the judiciary’s application of public policy to gambling
per se has actually remained quite stable.83
74. People v. Rosen, 78 P.2d 727, 728 (Cal. 1938).
75. See infra Part VI; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9,
at 43.
76. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 36 (“1832 [was]
apparently one of the peak years for lottery play . . . .”).
77. Id. (“By 1894 no state permitted the operation of lotteries, and thirty-five
states had explicit prohibitions in their constitutions against them.”) (citation
omitted).; see also DENISE VON HERRMANN, THE BIG GAMBLE 121 (2002) [hereinafter
HERRMAN].
78. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2 (“Currently, 37 states and the District
of Columbia have operating lotteries.”).  As of 2011 this number had risen to 40. See
GALE, STATE LOTTERIES, 0020 SURVEYS 21 (West 2011) (“Forty states permit
lotteries.”).
79. See Alexis, supra note 36.
80. See e.g. GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA BETTING GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION:
OUR HISTORY, supra note 23 (“[In Jamaica] [i]t was [therefore] inevitable that illegal
gambling would flourish in an environment where opportunities for gambling were
few and beyond the reach of most persons.”) (emphasis added).
81. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2 (“Currently, 37 states and the District
of Columbia have operating lotteries.”).  As of 2011 this number had risen to 40. See
GALE, STATE LOTTERIES, 0020 SURVEYS 21 (West 2011) (“Forty states permit
lotteries.”).
82. See, e.g., Government of Jamaica Betting, Gaming & Lotteries Commission,
Our History, supra note 23 (“Technological advances in radio, and telephone brought
the gambling activities of Great Britain and the U.S.A. closer to Jamaica . . . . The
norms and attitudes of the early 1900s could no longer be expected to remain
unchanged in the face of these exposures.”) (emphasis added), available at http://
www.bglc.gov.jm/about/history.html.
83. See, e.g., Stanley v. California Lottery Comm., No. C041034, 2003 WL
22026611, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“California’s “strong, long-standing public policy
regarding gambling is a broad policy against judicial resolution of civil claims arising
out of lawful or unlawful gambling contracts or transactions, and in the absence of a
statutory right to bring such claims, this policy applies both to actions for recovery of
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An almost irreconcilable contradiction has therefore contin-
ued to coexist.84  It consists of—on the one hand—the judiciary’s
almost intractable opposition to perceiving gambling generally as
a viable legal pursuit.85  On the other,86 is the legislature’s intensi-
fied resort to the raising of revenue from lotteries and the use of
this revenue in order to finance public expenditures as a substi-
tute87 for involuntary taxation88 and its consequences.89  Neverthe-
less, as this article proposes,90 there exists a seemingly tolerable
intellectual coexistence between the legislative and judicial
approaches to lotteries in the U.S.,91 which the Commonwealth
Caribbean arguably should emulate.92
This article explores the remarkable success of lotteries as a
voluntary and “painless” tax in the U.S. and the Commonwealth
Caribbean.93  It also discusses the common law principles of public
policy applicable to lotteries in the U.S.94 and the Commonwealth
gambling losses and actions to enforce gambling debts.”) (emphasis in the original)
(footnote omitted); see also Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d. 262, 267 (N.D. 2001)
(“Public policy is a principle of law whereby contracts will not be enforced if they have
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. . .Whether the
contract is against public policy is generally provided for by the state constitution or
statute. . .However, when a contract is inconsistent with fair and honorable dealing,
contrary to sound policy, and offensive to good morals, the courts have the authority
to declare the contract void as against public policy.”) (citations omitted).
84. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 11 (“There exists, in
short, an undeniable Jekyll-and-Hyde quality to state lotteries.”) (emphasis added).
See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 12 (“[L]ottery officials are . . . not free agents
operating on their own; they must respond to directions from state officials, which
often contain conflicting goals . . . .  This schizophrenic approach can lead to many
problems.”) (emphasis added).
85. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 12  (“It arises in part from our
ambivalence toward gambling itself.  On the one side is the traditional view of
gambling as a vice and the opprobrium directed toward those who overindulge.”).
86. See id. (“On the other is the wide acceptance of gambling in moderation as an
innocent form of amusement.”) (emphasis added).
87. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 11 (“In legalizing a
widely popular form of gambling, the states are accommodating consumer
preferences.”) (emphasis added).
88. See A Summary of the 1765 Stamp Act, supra note 3; DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 4; ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY, supra note 6.
89. See supra note 88, all of the sources cited therein.
90. See infra section X and the discussion therein.
91. See infra section X and the discussion therein.
92. See, e.g., Leacock, supra note 37, at 39 (discussing how the Board looked to
United States utility regulation decisions in interpreting the Public Utilities Act).
93. See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8 (“The principal argument used in
every state to promote the adoption of a lottery has focused on its value as a source of
‘painless’ revenue: players voluntarily spending their money (as opposed to the
general public being taxed) for the benefit of the public good.).
94. See Clotfelter, supra note 62, at 1 (“Until 1964, lotteries were illegal in every
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Caribbean, proposing that American public policy approaches will
be embraced and emulated by the Commonwealth Caribbean ter-
ritories.95  Part I is the Introduction.  Part II discusses lotteries as
prospective tax vehicles.  Part III analyzes how public policy is
conceived and enunciated by the U.S. judiciary and how it will be
emulated by the Commonwealth Caribbean territories on a case
by case basis as the need arises.  Part III also analyzes the origins
of public policy as it is applied to lotteries in the U.S. and will
probably be applied in the Commonwealth Caribbean as well.  It
explains that the U.S. fracture from Great Britain preceded the
Commonwealth Caribbean’s later separation from Great Britain
by almost two centuries.  This section anticipates the Common-
wealth Caribbean’s embrace and emulation of the U.S. experience
now that freedom from Great Britain has been attained.  Part IV
explores the evolution from past to present of legislative statutory
enactments applicable to lotteries in U.S. law and refers to the
Commonwealth Caribbean’s engrafting of these U.S. solutions
onto modern Commonwealth Caribbean legislative measures.
Part V discusses instances where the judiciary may decline to
nullify lottery agreements in some factual settings.  Part VI
chronicles the history and legal significance of lotteries in U.S.
and Commonwealth Caribbean law and highlights the tax-substi-
tute dependency on lotteries in the U.S.  Part VII focuses on the
impact of federal law on lotteries in the U.S., which has no coun-
terpart in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  Part VIII discusses the
evolution of public policy relating to lotteries in the U.S. and
assesses the judiciary’s success both in shaping public policy and
applying it to lotteries in the U.S.  It also discusses the prospects
that the Commonwealth Caribbean will emulate and fully
embrace the U.S. judiciary’s approach.  Part IX adds aspects of
federal law to the lottery law discussion.
Part X examines the legal impact of tax-substitution objec-
tives on legislative policies leading to statutory changes in the law
relating to lotteries and assesses the impact that these changes
have on public policy as enunciated by the judiciary earlier in the
article.  Part XI compares and contrasts the approaches of courts
that have nullified agreements pertaining to lotteries—on the one
hand—and courts that have declined to nullify such agreements
in appropriate circumstances—on the other.  It also assesses
state in this country.”).  This reality sets the stage for post-1964 legal developments
relating to public policy.
95. See supra notes 37, 38, all of the sources cited therein.
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future prospects with regard to the judiciary’s application of pub-
lic policy principles to agreements implicating lotteries.  It then
discusses the influence of tax factors on public policy and on lot-
tery law in the U.S. and the Commonwealth Caribbean in light of
the success of the lottery-proliferation phenomenon as a voluntary
and “painless tax.”  Part XII is the Conclusion.
II. LOTTERIES AS PROSPECTIVE TAX VEHICLES96
The legal definition of a lottery is one of substance rather
than terminology.97  However, the purpose of a lottery is enig-
matic.98  In the U.S., two selling points for lotteries tend to
predominate.99  Indeed, in essentially every case where states
have adopted lotteries, potential revenues and the beneficial socie-
tal deployment of those revenues have been the two principal sell-
ing points.100  Thomas Jefferson hardly ranks as a lottery-
supporter; nevertheless, he may have perceived them as poten-
tially a very potent tax-substitute.101  It is certainly irrefutable
that payments—for the purchase of lottery tickets—are made vol-
untarily by those who choose to play lotteries.102
Opponents of lotteries have also tended to embrace the cate-
gorization of lotteries as taxation since this categorization tends to
suit their purposes.103  Lottery-opponents have also claimed that—
based upon the conventional criteria for judging taxes—lotteries
have to be perceived in a negative light when compared to conven-
96. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (“Revenue is the
raison d’être of contemporary state lotteries.”); see also Did You Know, N. AM. ASS’N
OF STATE & PROVINCIAL LOTTERIES, http://www.naspl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
content&menuid=14&pageid=1020 (last visited Sep. 19, 2013) (“During fiscal year
2010 . . . U.S. lottery sales totaled $58 billion . . . .”).
97. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 51 (“The essence of a
lottery is the purchase of a chance to win a prize, based on a random drawing.”); see,
e.g. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 22 (“What’s in a name? That which we
call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet . . . .”).
98. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 249 (“[T]he basic
question is, what is the purpose of a lottery? Should it be evaluated primarily on the
basis of revenue performance . . . or should other considerations be given weight?”)
(emphasis added).
99. Id. at 215.
100. Id.; see also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2 (“[P]layers voluntarily
spending their money (as opposed to the general public being taxed) for the benefit of
the public good.”) (emphasis added).
101. See id; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 299.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 215 (“[L]otteries are said to be a relatively inefficient source of revenue
owing to the high ratio of administrative costs per dollar raised.”).
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tional taxes.104  The conventional criteria used for the comparison
of one tax with another seem to differ fundamentally from a sim-
ple assessment of the comparative profitability of lotteries as a
form of gambling.105
Furthermore, opponents assert that lotteries are regressive,106
“preying on the poor,” whether wittingly, by marketing heavily in
poor areas, or unwittingly, simply by offering a product that
appeals to poor people.”107  However, the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission does not seem to be as adamant108 as a
Maryland state senator—cited as an opponent of the lottery—
seems to be.109  The Commission made the effort to be balanced in
its report and referred to a definition used by economists relating
to the nature of a regressive tax.110  The Commission then indi-
cated that one empirical study concluded111 that “the poor partici-
104. Id. (“[This is] because of their alleged instability and limited revenue
potential.”).
105. See, e.g. NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“Lotteries have the highest profit
rates in gambling in the U.S. . . .) (emphasis added).
106. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (“[T]he charge
that has stung lottery proponents the hardest . . . is that lotteries are regressive.”); see
also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 9 (“[There] is the widespread conception that
the lottery is a regressive tax. . . .”).
107. Id. See also MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 43-44 (“[T]hose who oppose . . .
lotteries . . . usually invoke the argument that lotteries . . . prey on the poor. . . .
Therefore, it is in the best interest of society that lotteries . . . be outlawed.  They
would maintain that society cannot permit any activity that uses addiction of some
segment even if the rest of society might derive benefit.”) (emphasis added); see also
DAVID NIBERT, HITTING THE LOTTERY JACKPOT: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE TAXING
OF DREAMS 114 (2000) [hereinafter: NIBERT] (“The [NGISC] supported critics’
contentions that state lotteries “knowingly target their poorest citizens, employing
aggressive and misleading advertising to induce those individuals to gamble away
their limited means.””) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 10 (“[The] assumption [that lotteries are
regressive] . . . may not be accurate.  Much depends on the definition of ‘regressive.’”)
(emphasis added).
109. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (“[O]ne
Maryland state senator who opposed the lottery [stated]: ‘Lotteries place an
inordinate burden on the poor to finance state government.  But the poor are willing
suckers, and it’s hard to defend a group that doesn’t want to be defended.’”) (citation
omitted).
110. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 10 (“Economists define a regressive tax
as one that takes an increasing percentage of income as income falls.  In that sense,
given the fact that a lottery ticket is the same price to all, regardless of income, it is by
definition regressive . . . . But this simple approach does not capture such variables as
frequency of play and the amounts of money generated by the lottery by income
group. . . . The data suggests (although [it] is far from conclusive) that the bulk of lotto
players and revenues come from middle-income neighborhoods, and that far fewer
proportionally come from either high-income or low-income areas.”).
111. Id. (citing two nationally prominent commentators’ reference to an empirical
study done in the 1970s by John Koza).
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pate in the state lottery games at levels disproportionately less
than their percentage of the population.”112
Other criticisms of lotteries have been voiced as well.113  In the
opinion of one commentator, lotteries are not an efficient way to
raise money for government at all.114  This is additional to the
charge that lotteries are arguably regressive taxes,115 even if they
are “voluntary” as Thomas Jefferson has allegedly suggested.116
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission was created by
Congress in 1996117 and included the Chairman of Nevada’s State
Gaming Control Board as one of the nine Commissioners.118  The
Commission was assigned specific tasks by the pertinent legisla-
tion creating it.119
The commission strongly protested against lottery advertis-
ing.120  It suggested that this advertising was at times misleading
and that such advertising also encouraged some lottery players to
engage in irresponsible gambling.121  Moreover, the Commission
concluded that lotteries did not necessarily produce good jobs.122
Particular criticisms were directed towards convenience gambling
involving lotteries, and the Commission also recommended that
instant tickets should be banned.123  Additionally, the Commission
112. Id.
113. Id. (“The focus on convincing non-players to utilize the lottery, as well as
persuading frequent players to play even more, is the source of an additional array of
criticisms.”) (emphasis added).
114. See MATTHEW SWEENEY, THE LOTTERY WARS 133 (2009) [hereinafter SWEENEY)
(“No other ‘tax’ costs so much money to collect.  The state government spends a lot of
money on running lotteries.”) (emphasis added).
115. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 106.
116. See Id., at 299 n. 11.1.
117. See Archive, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION: MESSAGE FROM
THE CHAIR, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/news/chairman.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2013) [hereinafter NGISC: MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR] (“The Commission was
created by the 104th Congress through Public Law 104169, which was signed by
President Clinton on August 3, 1996.”).
118. See National Gambling Impact Study Commission: Fact Sheet, http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/bio-law.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (listing nine
members of the commission) [hereinafter, NGISC].
119. See Id.  In the statute, Congress set the duration of the Commission for two
years from the date of its first meeting, which took place in 1997.  The statute
mandated a report by the Commission to Congress, the President, and the governors
two years after the Commission held its first meeting.  This report with the
Commission’s Final Report Recommendations was made on June 18, 1999 and the
Commission thereafter archived its website in September 2001.
120. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 3-4-3-5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3-10.
123. Id. at 3-18.
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recommended that machine gaming outside of casinos—such as
video lottery terminals at racetracks—should be abolished.124
The criticism of lotteries as inappropriate redistributive-
income devices—that take “a disproportionate amount of [their]
revenues from lower-income groups”125—has also been levied.126
This redistribution of income point is somewhat different from the
regressivity issue.127  Redistribution of income focuses on the desti-
nation of the lottery funds, whereas regressivity examines on
whom does the cost-burden of lottery-play comparatively fall?  In
this sense, redistribution is neutral because of the entirely ran-
dom incidence of winners.  There is no conceivable way to predict
any redistribution of income from any particular income-group to
any other.  The poor, middle-income and rich win as randomly as
each one or the other wins.
Other issues such as the avoidance of jackpot wins by illegal
residents,128 or the potential misuse by welfare-recipients of gov-
ernment-provided funds129 are probably too infrequent to merit
public policy consideration.  Similarly, the unpreparedness for the
magnitude of the wealth that winning lottery jackpots may bring
and the concomitant possible lack of responsible use of the win-
nings are not fatal criticisms of the use of lotteries for funding gov-
ernmental-expenditures.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS
IMPACT ON LOTTERIES
[i] Commonwealth Caribbean Public Policy
“Law is . . . more than the sum of its separate parts: it is an
organic whole which is not solely dependent upon legislatures for
its development, but is in the process of constant, if not always
obvious or rapid growth, through the activities of those who . . .
administer it in any given country over a period of time.”130  This
124. Id.
125. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 10.
126. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 221.
127. See supra note 106–108.
128. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 221–22.
129. Id.
130. See Sir Roy Marshall, The Response of the Law to the Challenging of
Independence: A Review of the Past and an Agenda for the Future, with Particular
Reference to Barbados, in COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES: A VOLUME OF
ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES 1 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P.K. Menon eds.,1992)
[hereinafter Sir Roy Marshall]. See also F.A. HOYOS, BARBADOS OUR ISLAND HOME 177
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organic evolution of law in the territories of the Commonwealth
Caribbean reflects the fact that these territories remained colo-
nies long after the American colonies won independence from Brit-
ish rule.131  During this extensive colonial period, decisions
relating to tax sources of revenue—as well as to all other signifi-
cant political and economic decisions—were made in Great Brit-
ain as the colonial power.
In fact, the earliest date of independence for any of the former
colonies of the Commonwealth Caribbean was 1962,132 which falls
within the modern era of lottery history and development.  As a
result of the relatively recent acquisition of independence from
Great Britain, litigation implicating public policy in the context of
the legal validity of lotteries would tend to reflect the quest for
autonomy from Great Britain.  This affinity for judicial autonomy
would therefore tend to instill the confidence to draw on the judi-
cial experience of other common law jurisdictions such as the
extensive experience of the U.S. in this regard.133  This is the case
because the extensive judicial decisions—throughout the legal his-
tory of lotteries in the U.S.—have no counterpart in the Common-
wealth Caribbean experience.134  As a result, the courts in the
Commonwealth Caribbean territories would, on a case by case
basis, as the need arises, in all likelihood look to the U.S. judici-
ary’s experience and expertise for guidance.135
[ii] U.S. Public Policy Generally
Public policy is the principle that “no one can lawfully do that
which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public
(1960) (“[N]o form of government can be effective unless the laws are observed and
justice administered.”). See also Hon. David Simmons, Judicial Legislation for the
Commonwealth Caribbean: The Death Penalty and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, 3 CARIB. L.B. 10 (1998). (“Law is . . . a response to social needs and
pressures.”).
131. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 36; see also CARIBBEAN ISLANDS: A COUNTRY STUDY (Sandra W.
Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1987), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCIDx0018)(“[An] uneasy federation of ten island
territories (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica,
and Montserrat) lasted from 1957 to 1961, when Jamaica opted to leave.”).
133. See Leacock: Public Utility Regulation, supra note 37, at 339.
134. The judiciary in British Colonies cannot—during colonial subjugation—
display the judicial freedom and creativity of independent former colonies such as the
unique experience of the U.S. subsequent to gaining independence from Great
Britain.
135. See Leacock: Public Utility Regulation, supra note 37, at 339.
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good.”136  Public policy has even been declared to be synonymous
with “the public good.”137  It has been referred to as the “purpose
and spirit of the substantive laws of a state. . .”138 Violations of
public policy have often been associated with immorality.139  Pub-
lic policy is essentially statewide in scope140 and therefore
embraces the principles perceived by both the legislature and the
judiciary as the foundation on which the particular state and its
entire society stand.141  It consists of the values, norms, and ideals
of each individual society.142  Actually, it resembles the parsing by
the judiciary of fundamental constitutional rights created by the
U.S. Constitution.143
The application of public policy principles to lotteries is there-
fore evolutionary144 and subject to change as times change.145
Inevitably, therefore, the public policy of one generation may be
discarded entirely or partially by a later generation.146  An impor-
tant reason why this may be the case is the fact that the size of the
136. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959); see also CARDOZO, supra
note 30.
137. Dille v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 196 S.W.2d 615, 629 (Mo. 1946).
138. Johnston v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 164 S.W. 260, 262 (Mo. Ct. App.
1914).
139. State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36 (1873) (court consideration of the regulation of
“bawdy houses”); see also Kitchen v. Greenabaum, 61 Mo. 110, 116 (1875); see, e.g.
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 127 S.W. 118, 120 (1910) (“[T]he promotion of public and
private morals is one of the chief purposes of the law.”); see also Muschany v. United
States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-7 (1945) (holding “violations of obvious ethical or moral
standards” contrary to public policy).
140. See Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at 4 (“[A]s early as the beginning of the
fifteenth century[,] [l]egal scholars . . . endorsed seemingly parallel concepts which
may well have been the rudimentary beginnings of our present “public policy”
concept.”).
141. Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 898, 902 (Kan. 2002); see also
Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954).
142. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (1986). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-
36 (1938)).
143. See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (“[I]t may
be said that judicial opinion cannot be controlled by legislative opinion of what are
fundamental rights.”).
144. Brown v. Snohomish County Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 338 (Wash. 1993)
(“The term ‘public policy,’ . . . embraces all . . . contracts which tend clearly to injure
. . . the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the
law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights. . . .  Public policy is
not static, but may change as the relevant factual situation and the thinking of the
times change.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933); see also Hall v. Baylous, 153
S.E. 293, 295 (W. Va. 1930); see also Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 254 N.Y.
407, 413 (1930).
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population of a state tends to progressively increase over time,
with a concomitant impact on the financial exigencies of human
needs in the particular state.  Courts must therefore be cognizant
of such changes and must be responsive by acknowledging the
scope of any necessary adjustments to the contours of the particu-
lar state’s public policy.147
This inevitably leads to continual questioning of public policy,
by analogy to prospecting for the precious metal gold.  In the con-
text of contract disputes generally, just as gold nuggets must be
prospected from the surrounding debris, the judiciary’s task is to
do the same with regard to a state’s public policy.148  Legally
appropriate modifications pertaining to lotteries will therefore be
selected, examined and implemented by the judiciary as the need
arises.149  In analyzing lottery contracts as well as any other type
of contract, courts may employ a balancing test150 and may refuse
to enforce components of a particular contract, rather than nullify-
ing the entire contract.151  By the same token, where the facts and
circumstances are convincing to the judiciary, the application of
public policy by the court can be decisive.152  Alternatively, the
147. See, e.g., Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. 1993)
(referring to a physician’s duty of confidentiality to her/his patients, and enunciating
that “the common law and the public policy of this state are not stagnant but are
evolutionary.”).
148. Owens v. Owens, 854 S.W.2d  52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“Courts have a duty
to criticize and reexamine the relationship of the rule[s] [enunciated in earlier court
decisions applicable] to public policy and to make modifications.”) (citation omitted).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Continental Basketball Ass’n, Inc. v. Ellenstein Enters., Inc., 669
N.E.2d 134, 140 (Ind. 1996) (“[W]e take the same balancing approach . . . .”).
151. Irrefutably, in appropriate circumstances, the Supreme Court certainly has
the legal power to nullify or reform a contract to eliminate any provisions or terms
that violate public policy. See id. at 139-140; see also Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d 723,
732 (Ala. 2002) (“This Court . . . can . . . nullify or reform a contract to eliminate any
. . . terms that violate public policy.”).
152. See, e.g., Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 413
(Wyo. 1977) (“The trial judge left the parties where he found them on what he held to
be a gambling contract . . . and [we] affirm.”); see also MidMichigan Regional Medical
Center—Clare v. Professional Employees Div. of Local 79, Service Employee Intern.
Union, AFL-CIO, 183 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 1999) (public policy may not
unambiguously support the permanent separation of a medical care professional from
further provision of medical care to the general public, in spite of some proven acts of
negligence); Fomby-Denson v. Dept. of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(public policy encouraging the detection of possible criminal activity may legally
justify particular action); Gonzales v. Nissan Motor Corp in Hawaii, Ltd., 58 P.3d
1196, 1217 (Haw. 2002) (promises which are offensive to public policy will not be
enforced by the judiciary); Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 676 N.E.2d 1295,
303 (Ill. 1997); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000); First Nat. Ins. Co. of
America v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Mo. 1995); Clark v. Columbia/HCA
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courts can remand a particular case for further consideration in
light of the guidance provided by the superior court.153
At one end of the contract spectrum, some aspects of bargains
may be much too offensive to society for courts to rule in favor of
enforcing these aspects at all.154  However, enforcement of a settle-
ment agreement relating to such violative bargains may neverthe-
less be fully enforceable based upon a state’s affirmative public
policy favoring settlements.155  It falls squarely within the judicial
function to properly conduct and effectuate this delicate balancing
expertise.156  Proof that an agreement is injurious to the public or
operates against the public good must be judicially convincing
before a court will nullify a party’s right to the enforcement of
such an agreement.157  This is separate and distinct from any nul-
lification of a party’s fundamental legal right of freedom of con-
tract.158  The party’s fundamental right of freedom of contract
endures undamaged and intact.159  It is the abuse of freedom of
contract to the point of violating public policy that the court will
nullify.160  In instances where freedom of contract has not been
abused, such contracts do not violate public policy at all and will
be fully enforced.161
Of course, an unambiguous mandate in a state’s constitution
or state statute must be judicially honored.162  It is legally appro-
priate for the question as to whether or not a contract is against
Information Services, Inc., 25 P.3d 215, 220 (Nev. 2001) (the court may of course
reverse a grant of summary judgment and may remand the case); Harper v.
Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 964 (N.H. 1996); Padilla v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 901, 905 (N.M. 2003); Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626
N.W.2d 262, 277 (N.D. 2001).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000
(N.Y. 1993) (“In sum, we agree with the Appellate Division that subparagraph 18(a) is
unenforceable as against public policy.”) (Emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1001 (“It is all a matter of degree.”).
157. First Nat. Ins. Co. of America v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Mo. 1995) (“[T]he
Court will not recognize contractual provisions that are contrary to the public policy of
[the state] as expressed by the legislature.”) (Emphasis added).
158. Id. (“This Court . . . recognize[s] freedom of contract.”).
159. Id; see also Johnson v. Peterbilt Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 164 (N.D. 1989)
(“When a court is faced with deciding whether a contract is against public policy, it
must also be mindful of an individual’s right to enter into a contract.”).
160. Johnson, 438 N.W. 2d at 164.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 169; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-02 (West 2013) (providing
that all contracts which have for their object exemption of persons from responsibility
for their own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another or willful
negligent violation of law, are against the policy of the law).
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public policy to be explicitly provided for by a state’s constitution
or by a statute.163  This means that when the court determines
that a contract is inconsistent with fair and honorable dealing, it
can deny such agreement’s enforcement.164  Therefore, where the
agreement in issue is ruled by the court to be contrary to sound
policy, and offensive to good morals, the courts have the authority
to declare such a contract void as against public policy.165
In the absence of a constitutional or statutory mandate, the
common law has concluded that lottery contracts will not be judi-
cially honored.166  Rather, the courts will not assist the parties to
such agreements and will leave such parties where the courts find
them.167  This is the case in state courts as well as in the U.S.
Supreme Court.168  Public policy is neither a function of the subjec-
tive view of any individual judge169 nor of any speculative concep-
tion of the public interest.170  Nor does the judiciary of a single
state perceive itself as the exclusive source171 of the fundamentals
that are components of public policy.172  This has been judicially
163. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-02 (West 2013).
164. Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 164; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-01 (West
2013) (deeming contracts unlawful if contrary to express law; contrary to policy of
express law, although not expressly prohibited; or contrary to good morals).
165. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-01 (West 2013).
166. See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 28 N.E.2d 207, 215 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1940) (“The law will not aid a party to a lottery contract either in its enforcement
while executory or in its rescission when executed.”) (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 216 (“[E]quity keeps its hands off, and leaves the parties where it finds
them . . . . [P]arties wanting [equity’s] aid must come with clean hands. Courts of
equity require honesty, good faith, and legality in transactions . . . .”) (citation
omitted).
168. Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 601 (1884) (“[It is an]
elementary principle that one who has himself participated in a violation of law
cannot be permitted to assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing
out of the illegal transaction.”) (citations omitted); see also Holman v. Johnson, 98
Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
169. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir.
1992). See also Bartron v. Codington Cnty., 2 N.W.2d 337, 348-49 (S.D. 1942). See also
Haakinson & Beauty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Neb. 1984) ([P]ublic
policy must be determined . . . not by the varying opinions of laymen, lawyers, or
judges.”) (citation omitted).
170. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 998 F.2d 404, 409 (7th
Cir. 1993). See also Fomby-Denson v. Dept. of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
171. See, e.g., Talley v. Mathis, 453 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ga. 1995) (The fundamental
policies of a sister state can be judicially significant.  Therefore a joint venture to buy
lottery tickets in a sister state does not necessarily violate the public policy of the
state where suit is filed when the sale of lottery tickets is lawful in that sister state).
Discussed infra Sec. XI [iii].
172. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. c (1981)
(advocating that members of a class of protected parties may be recognized by the
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acknowledged.173 This does not in any way suggest that public pol-
icy is amorphous, vague or indefinite.174  On the contrary, it is
legally sturdy and venerable in the hands of the judiciary as the
challenge of each decision is met.175
IV. LOTTERY LEGALIZATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN AND THE U.S.
Commonwealth Caribbean
With independence and concomitant legal autonomy dating
only from the 1960s,176 the Commonwealth Caribbean has not
needed the extensive provisions required in the U.S. to effect lot-
tery legalization.  Since there were no constitutional or statutory
barriers to the creation of lotteries in the Commonwealth Carib-
bean comparable to the U.S. provisions, legislation sufficed.  For
example, Jamaica passed “the Betting Gaming & Lotteries Act,
1965 . . . [with] [t]he main aims of . . . provid[ing] that lotteries, on
the whole, though explicitly termed illegal, may be exempted from
illegality and allowed to be conducted under certain conditions
and subject to certain strict safeguards.”177
U.S.
[i] Constitutional and Statutory Factors
In the U.S., there is no common law178 or constitutional right
to gamble.179  As a result, the suppression of gambling resides
within the state law of each of the fifty states in the U.S. and
judiciary as exempt from specific nullifications - imposed on outsiders to the protected
class - in light of the protected status of the members of the protected class).
173. In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. 120, 124 (Mo. 1927) (holding that it was not
against public policy to enforce a will provision, written in 1916, directing that money
should be used to “assist widows, orphans, and invalids” of Germany, then at war
with the United States).
174. See Leacock: Lotteries and Public Policy, supra note 15, at 48.
175. Id. at 48–49.
176. See Alexis, supra note 36, at 591 n.2; see also Simmons, supra note 36, at 670.
177. See The Betting, Gaming & Lotteries Act of 1976, GOV’T OF JAMAICA, BETTING,
GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION, http://www.bglc.gov.jm/laws/bglcact/default.html
(last modified Mar. 2009) (“It appeared . . . that the Government wished that
gambling should make its fair contributions to the revenue of the country, like other
sectors, to provide employment and to assist in works of public interest.”).
178. See South Carolina Dept. of Revenue & Taxation v. Rosemary Coin Machines,
Inc., 500 S.E.2d 176, 180 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (“There is no fundamental right to
gamble.”).
179. Baseball, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 683 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. 1997);
State v. Louisville Atlantis Community/Adapt, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 810, 817 (Ky. Ct. App.
1997) (noting no one has a constitutional right to operate a gambling business). No
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inheres within the police powers of each state.180  State suppres-
sion of gambling does not infringe upon any fundamental rights of
citizenship181 and states can therefore either prohibit or restrict
gambling182 as a legitimate exercise of the state’s inherent police
power; but, “the legislature cannot bargain away the police power
of a State.”183
Some state constitutions may forbid lotteries, the sale of lot-
tery tickets, as well as any legislative authorization of lotteries.184
A particular state’s legislature cannot legalize any device that in
substantive effect amounts to a lottery185 in the face of an unam-
biguous state constitutional provision that specifically prohibits
lotteries.186  Therefore, in those instances where a state’s constitu-
tion forbids lotteries, a constitutional provision would be neces-
sary187 in order to permit a legislature to authorize lotteries
operated either privately or by the state itself.188  However, if the
one has a constitutional right to operate a gambling business.  Durham Highway Fire
Protection Ass’n, Inc. v. Baker, 351 S.E.2d 744 (N.C. 1987).
180. See Rosemary, 500 S.E.2d at 179 (“The government is imbued with the power
to legislate for the protection of the public health, welfare and morals.”). Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (“[The police power] extends to all matters
affecting the public health or the public morals.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
181. Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 504 (1905).
182. Fendrich v. Van de Kamp, 227 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); People
v. Monroe, 182 N.E. 439 (Ill. 1932); American Legion Post No. 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d
1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Louisville Atlantis Community/Adapt, Inc.,
971 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Brown v. State, 680 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1996);
Parkes v. Bartlett, 210 N.W. 492, 495 (Mich. 1926); State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of
Com’rs of City of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d 570 (Nev. 1931); State v. Felton, 80 S.E.2d 625
(N.C. 1954); South Carolina Dept. of Revenue & Taxation v. Rosemary Coin Machs.,
Inc., 500 S.E.2d 176, 179 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding prohibiting gambling is a
legitimate governmental purpose under the police power); State ex rel. Spire v.
Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 428 (Neb. 1991).
183. See, e.g., Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879).
184. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tyson v. Ted’s Game Enters., 893 So.2d 355, 368 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002) (citing Ala. CONST. art. 4,§ 65); Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238,
248 (S.D. 1994) (citing S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 25); State v. Nixon, 384 N.E.2d 152. 155
(Ind. 1979) (citing Ind. CONST. art. 15, § 8).
185. See supra note 9, all of the sources cited therein.
186. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 490 (Fla. 1935) (However, the state’s
legislature would probably have the inherent power to regulate or to prohibit any and
all other forms of gambling not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the state
constitution.).
187. See, e.g., Hansen & Skopek, supra note 9, at 169 (“Six constitutional
amendments in three decades modified Wisconsin’s strict [constitutional] ban on all
forms of gambling . . . . Two amendments to the state constitution authorized a state-
operated lottery . . . .”) (citations omitted).
188. Id; see also West Virginia ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan, 438 S.E.2d
308, 311-12 (W. Va. 1993) (of course, the doctrine of strict construction would require
that only the express or implied mandate of the provision is to be honored).
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prohibition against creation of a state-run lottery is statutory,
rather than constitutional, the legislature retains the legal power
to create a lottery at any later time by legislative abrogation or
amendment.189
An absolute constitutional bar to the creation of a lottery
could extend beyond lotteries to include any gaming conception
based upon the lottery principle.190  However, the interpretation of
constitutional, or statutory measures, inheres within the powers
of the judiciary.191  By virtue of the separation of powers mandated
by the U.S. and state constitutions, this constitutional allocation
of legal capacity to the judiciary would empower the judiciary to
construe a constitutional provision as an absolute bar to lotteries
where such a construction is appropriate to the accurate interpre-
tation of the specific provision.192  In such instances, the courts
would need to analyze each type of gambling in issue in order to
determine whether or not it substantively constituted a lottery.193
Some devices may constitute lotteries while others may not.194  If a
type of gambling were to be construed as not being a lottery it
would survive legal nullification by the courts,195 provided that the
type of gambling in issue fell outside the parameters of the consti-
tutional prohibition.196
However, the express or implied prohibition of lotteries by the
state constitution is different.197  Such prohibitions—when com-
bined with the constitutional imposition of penalties for specified
189. State ex rel Clark v. State Canvassing Bd., 888 P.2d 458 (N.M. 1995) (In such
circumstances, any pre-authorization legal authority by a constitutional amendment
would not be required.).
190. See Try-Me Bottling Co. v. State, 178 So. 231, 235 (Ala. 1938).
191. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 171 (1803) (“[A] legal question [is] properly
determinable in the courts . . . .”) (emphasis added).
192. See State ex rel. Gabalac v. New Universal Congregation of Living Souls, 379
N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (“We conclude that [the pertinent section of the
state constitution] prohibits only one type of gambling namely, lotteries. Therefore, the




195. Provided that the type of gambling did not violate the public policy of the
particular state.
196. See Gabalac, 379 N.E.2d at 244 (“[The lower court’s decision] is predicated
upon an expanding of the definition of the word “lottery” to include all gambling. We
cannot adhere to this view. A lottery is a scheme whereby a monetary consideration is
paid and the winner of the prize is determined by lot or chance.  A lottery is a species
of gambling. The term “gambling” is broader and encompasses more than the term
“lottery.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
197. See Silberman v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 169 A. 170, 172 (N.J.Com.Pl. 1933).
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violations—disable the legislature of the particular state from
legitimately diminishing any of the constitutionally mandated
penalties; or other punitive measures mandated for the operation
of constitutionally prohibited lotteries.198  The nature of the use of
the proceeds is not at all a decontaminant of unconstitutional-
ity.199  Therefore, proof that the proceeds derived from the opera-
tion of a lottery support the fundamental societal value of
financial assistance to charity is not enough to overcome the pres-
ence of a constitutional prohibition.200
[ii] Some Influences on the Legalization of Lotteries
The forces that impact the adoption of a state lottery are not
unknown to the judiciary, and the judiciary is also conversant
with the factors that legislators may take into account in deciding
whether or not to create a state lottery.201  Additionally, in the
U.S., interest groups routinely play a significant role in shaping
the electorate’s willingness to support the passage of specific legis-
lative enactments, including those targeting the legalization of
lotteries.202  The viewpoints of interest groups inevitably influence
the voting decisions of elected officials.  In addition, interest
groups use inter alia lobbying,203 advertising204 and political contri-
butions to the election campaigns of politicians in the effort to
achieve maximum political impact on important decisions made
by politicians.
Furthermore, decisions reached by policymakers and voters
in a particular state may influence decisions made in other states.
198. Id.
199. State ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 289 N.W. 600, 603-04 (Wis. 1940).
200. Id.
201. These statewide norms relate to annual income, education and age of the
electorate. They also relate to the anticipated reactions of the electorate to the
legislation itself in addition to the legislation’s potential influence on moral values
and issues.
202. See e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 42 (“The
depression spawned a flurry of proposals for lotteries at the state and federal levels.
At the same time a group of lottery supporters . . . formed the National Conference for
Legalizing Lotteries, to push for lotteries at the state and national levels . . . .); see id.
at 11 (“For most of the country the central policy question concerning lotteries today
is no longer whether states should legalize them – voters in state after state have
answered that [in the affirmative] . . . .”) (emphasis added).
203. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625, (1954) (The First Amendment
guarantees the right to speak to, publish to and petition the government); see also
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 141(“[A] new element has acted
as a catalyst for change: the active lobbying of firms involved in the sale of lottery
products.”).
204. See e.g. NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 6.
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Lottery profitability in one state may impact the decision of other
states to create and implement lotteries of their own, because the
geographical proximity of one state to another may impact the
economic prosperity of both neighboring states.205  In particular,
economic prosperity generated by a state’s lottery may be noticea-
ble and influential politically in neighboring states206 and may
trigger similar action therein.207
Additionally, adoption and implementation of a lottery by one
state may serve as a stimulus for a neighboring state to amend its
constitution208 to create a lottery of its own and may also provide a
blueprint for a neighboring state to emulate.  Use of the referen-
dum method has been particularly successful,209 which has made
statewide referenda a popular state legal-adoption device.210  In
other states, a referendum in the form of a popular vote combined
with approval by the state legislature may be used to create the
lottery as was done in New Hampshire.211  Arguably, use of a refer-
endum might be the most decisive method because it allocated the
final decision to be made by the electorate itself rather than vicar-
iously by the electorate’s elected representatives acting in the leg-
islature alone.
New York was more complex, requiring a constitutional
amendment in addition to endorsement by two separately elected
205. See e.g., SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 73 (“The successful province drains the
life out of the unsuccessful . . . .”); see  also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra
note 9, at 150 (“[A] lottery in one state will attract players from neighboring states.”);
see also id. at 4 (“The idea of having a state-run public lottery in Illinois began to
receive serious attention in the early 1970s.  Lotteries had already appeared in the
Northeast, and by 1972 seven states were operating them . . . the success of the New
Jersey lottery seems to have captured the attention of the Illinois legislature, as it did
in other states.”) (emphasis added),
206. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 150 (“The idea of having
a state-run public lottery in Illinois began to receive serious attention in the early
1970’s. Lotteries had already appeared in the Northeast, and by 1972 seven states
were operating them . . . the success of the New Jersey lottery seems to have captured
the attention of the Illinois legislature, as it did in other states.”) (emphasis added).
207. Id. Neighboring states may create their own lotteries as financial and
economic self-defense because of the number of border-crossings by residents from
neighboring states that might siphon off needed funds totaling in the millions
annually. See, e.g., SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 73 (“[N]othing stagnates like
stagnation.”).
208. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 154–58.
209. Id. at 146 (“Of the nearly thirty referenda on lotteries since 1964, only a
handful have failed. . . .”).
210. Id. at 145 (“Because the anti-lottery sentiment of the nineteenth century had
resulted in constitutional bars against lotteries in most states, referenda or initiatives
were often required to bring about the necessary changes in state constitutions.”).
211. Id. at 143.
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legislatures as well as public ratification.212  California was differ-
ent too.  California adopted its lotteries through an initiative pro-
cess.213  In Illinois, lottery adoption was achieved in the orthodox
legislative manner by the combination of the state’s legislature
and governor without a direct citizen vote.214
V. COURTS IN SOME INSTANCES MAY DECLINE TO APPLY
PUBLIC POLICY TO NULLIFY AGREEMENTS
CONNECTED TO LOTTERIES
Under the common law, the holding of a lottery is not ordina-
rily regarded as a penal offense unless either a state constitution
criminalizes such activity or alternatively a state statute imposes
criminal penalties.215  However, in a number of jurisdictions, the
legislature has by statute made it a criminal offense to promote or
conduct a lottery or similar scheme other than one operated by the
state.216  The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that
state laws for the suppression of lotteries are valid in the interests
of promoting good morals and preserving the welfare of the citi-
zens of such states.217  Such statutes therefore represent a legiti-
mate exercise of a state’s police powers.218  Nevertheless, even in
the face of criminalization of lotteries, the common law’s recogni-
tion of exceptions in deserving cases remains legally viable
because, the common law is a workable system rather than a rigid
212. Id.
213. Id. at 151.
214. See id. at 5 (“In December 1973 the [Illinois] state legislature passed a lottery
bill, and the governor signed it into law with assurances that the lottery would be run
honestly.”).
215. See generally Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486 (Fla. 1935); Becker v. Wilcox,
116 N.W. 160 (Neb. 1908); see also Parr v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1957).
216. Forte v. U.S., 83 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Waite v. Press Pub. Ass’n, 155 F. 58
(6th Cir. 1907); State v. Shugart, 35 So. 28 (Ala. 1903); Burks v. Harris, 120 S.W. 979
(Ark. 1909); Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Warren, 262 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979); L.E. Services, Inc. v. State Lottery Com’n of Indiana, 646 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 166 S.W. 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914); Mid-
Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Chen, Walsh & Tecler, 460 A.2d  44 (Md.
1983); People v. McPhee, 103 N.W. 174 (Mich. 1905); State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340
(N.C. 1915); Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 73 N.E. 1058 (Ohio 1905).
217. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) (“It is the duty and
function of the legislature to discern and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean
some definite injury, but obstacles to a greater public welfare.”) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). See also Town of Eros v. Powell, 68 So. 632, 364 (La. 1915); State v.
J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 59 So. 923, 928 (Miss. 1912); see generally State v. Lipkin,
84 S.E. 340 (N.C. 1915).
218. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916).
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and immutable one.219
Therefore the common law’s orthodox exceptions to the gen-
eral principle of non-enforcement of illegal contracts are also
applicable to agreements involving lotteries.220  These exceptions
are fact-specific and depend upon proof of meticulously circum-
scribed details.221  This means that the presence of an illegal ele-
ment is not invariably fatal to judicial enforcement in every
case.222  The judiciary will acknowledge and recognize exceptions
on successful proof that the facts and circumstances of a specific
case justify enforcement of a particular agreement.223  The degree
of contamination by the illegal element is determinative.224
An insufficient degree of contamination will not be enough to
mandate court intervention to nullify the entire suit in such
cases.225  The judiciary may provide some226 relief where the
requested relief is appropriate because it is legally justified.227  In
the context of each controversy, the judiciary will assess whether
or not enforcement of an entire agreement or a portion of it will
advance a fundamentally positive public policy goal.228  It is cer-
tainly conceded that the party seeking enforcement—whether
partially or completely—must shoulder the burden of proof to the
court’s satisfaction that the quantum of enforcement sought is fair
and equitable.  This is entirely appropriate because it would
represent performance of the courts’ ameliorative function in the
interests of justice and fairness. Complete or partial enforcement
219. See e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Conn. 1977) (“The common law
is viable, capable of growing and developing.”).; see also Rt. Hon. P.J. Patterson,
Towards a New Jurisprudence, 2 CARIB. L. B. 1, 3 (1997) (“Relevant jurisprudence
cannot remain static.  It must forever be unfolding if we are to ensure that the Law is
a vehicle for justice and not an instrument of oppression.”).
220. See e.g., Melton v. United Retail Merchants of Spokane, 24 Wash.2d 145, 162
(Wash. 1945).
221. See e.g., Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So.2d 855 (Ala. 1984).
222. See e.g., Melton, 24 Wash. 2d at 162 (“[A] plaintiff may recover a sum of money
from a defendant who has acknowledged that it belongs to plaintiff even if that sum
be plaintiff’s share of the profits of some illegal business or transaction in which both
were engaged and equally culpable.”) (Emphasis added).
223. See id. (“This is so because the plaintiff, in such a situation, need prove nothing
illegal, but has only to prove that the defendant has acknowledged the sum sued for to
belong to him, and the court will then, as a matter of law, imply the promise to pay.”)
(emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. See generally Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So.2d 855 (Ala. 1984).
226. Even if complete relief is not legally substantiated.
227. See generally Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So.2d 855 (Ala. 1984).
228. Id. at 860 (“[E]ven though the contract between the plaintiffs and the
defendant is based on an illegal lottery, we believe these plaintiffs are deserving of
relief because of the fraud perpetrated on them by the defendant.”) (emphasis added).
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in such circumstances advances the interests of justice because it
is an integral part of the public policy principles of the common
law itself.229
[i] Analysis of Differing Degrees of Culpability and The
Impact on Nullification by the Courts
It is conceded that an agreement is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy where the agreement itself constitutes an illegal
lottery.230  Nevertheless, assertion of a cause of action may be
treated by courts as valid even though the facts of the case estab-
lish that there is some contact with illegality.231  The courts will
assess the degree of legal contamination arising from the illegal-
ity.232  Essentially, the judiciary determines whether or not the
degree of contamination is legally fatal.233  If it is, the courts will
not assist any of the parties to the dispute and instead will leave
them where the courts find them.234  If the degree of contamination
from any violation of public policy is below legally fatal levels, the
courts may provide assistance to the less culpable party in appro-
priate circumstances.235
Youngblood v. Bailey effectively analyzes the common law’s
approach to resolving these intertwined issues.236  In Youngblood
v. Bailey, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that in the
context of the facts of the particular case, the transaction consist-
ing of the purchase of a ticket—conferring upon the purchaser a
chance to win a certain luxury car—was void on grounds of public
policy.237  The transaction consisting of the purchase of the ticket
was “a lottery and directly violate[d] the public policy of [the]
State.”238  This violation triggered court-nullification of the legal
status of the ticket-purchase but the legal nullification took effect
229. See Patterson, supra note 219.




234. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 413 (Wyo.
1977) (“The trial judge left the parties where he found them on what he held to be a
gambling contract . . . and [we] affirm.”). See also Gridley v. Dorn, 57 Cal. 78, 79 (Cal.
1880)(“[W]agers [are] contrary to good morals and sound public policy, and therefore
invalid.”).
235. Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So.2d 855 (Ala. 1984).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 859.
238. Id.
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between the original parties to the ticket-purchase transaction.239
However, in the suit before the courts, additional facts were
legally relevant.  The original purchaser of the ticket had sold the
ticket to a subsequent purchaser who fraudulently purported to
pay for the ticket with a legally defective check.240  These addi-
tional facts implicated the issue of potential exceptions to the fun-
damental principle of nullification of transactions on grounds of
public policy.241  In legally appropriate instances, under the com-
mon law, “contracts offensive to the public policy of the state may
be enforced because of the inability of an affected party to plead
their invalidity.”242
In such cases, any success by plaintiffs is predicated upon
proof by such plaintiffs of two mandatory requirements.243  First,
plaintiffs must prove that they are not equally at fault with the
defendant(s).244  Secondly, plaintiffs must also prove that public
policy interests are substantively advanced by the discretionary
grant of court assistance to the less culpable party or parties to
the particular transaction.245
In those instances where it is proven to the courts’ satisfac-
tion that one party has fraudulently induced another to enter into
a particular transaction, in their discretion, the courts may pro-
vide assistance to the fraudulently-induced party.246  In Young-
blood v. Bailey, the courts concluded that the original purchaser of
a lottery ticket had been defrauded.247  The original purchaser had
been fraudulently induced, by the fraudulent perpetrations of the
subsequent purchaser, to sell the pertinent lottery ticket to the
subsequent purchaser of the ticket.248  This fraudulent inducement
by the subsequent purchaser legally invalidated his own purchase
of the lottery ticket.249  This fraudulent conduct by the subsequent
purchaser of the lottery ticket left the title to the luxury car won
239. Id.
240. Id. at 860 (“Testimony was . . . produced at trial to indicate that this was in
fact the fourth time the defendant had utilized the same scheme to defraud persons
out of lottery tickets.”) (emphasis added).
241. Youngblood, 459 So. 2d. at 860.
242. Id. at 859; see also Melton v. United Retail Merchants of Spokane, 163 P.2d.
619, 627 (Wash. 1945).





248. Youngblood, 459 So. 2d at 860.
249. Id.
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by the lottery ticket undisturbed.250  Title to the luxury car there-
fore remained securely vested in the plaintiff as the original pur-
chaser of the lottery ticket.251
The facts and circumstances of the case justified the grant of
judicial relief to plaintiff as the original purchaser of the lottery
ticket.252  The invocation of common law exceptions by the courts
therefore provided relief to the original purchaser of the lottery
ticket against the fraudulent subsequent purchaser, as well as
against any party whose claim was dependent upon such subse-
quent purchaser’s legal iniquities.253  These principles were
applied by the courts because the subsequent purchaser’s fraudu-
lent representations to the original purchaser of the lottery ticket
induced the subsequent sale of the ticket.254  The fraudulent repre-
sentations made by the defendant as subsequent purchaser con-
sisted of assertions to the original purchaser that the defendant
had sufficient funds to meet the amount of the check actually ten-
dered to plaintiff by the defendant as payment for the purchase of
the lottery ticket.255
The subsequent purchaser’s substantive defense was predi-
cated upon a claim that under the terms of his subsequent
purchase-contract with the original purchaser of the lottery ticket,
valid legal title to the lottery ticket was transferred to him
alone.256  The subsequent purchaser argued that the illegality of
the original purchaser’s acquisition of the lottery ticket legally
nullified all the original purchaser’s rights.257  According to the
defendant, since the original purchase of the ticket was void of any
legal effect, this therefore nullified any right that the original pur-
chaser may have had to reclaim title to the lottery ticket from
him.258  The defendant therefore asserted that his possession of
the lottery ticket constituted valid title to it because the ticket
conferred on him alone the entire valid legal title to the luxury car
symbolically represented by the lottery ticket.259











260. Youngblood, 459 So. 2d. at 860.
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defendant’s fraud at common law disabled him from pleading—as
a defense—any underlying illegality of plaintiff’s title to the lot-
tery ticket that plaintiff purchased from the Northport Chamber
of Commerce.261  The defendant’s fraudulent conduct completely
nullified any prospect of a defense predicated upon any legal chal-
lenge by him to plaintiff’s title to the lottery ticket.262  This was the
case because defendant’s purported defense was nullified by the
fraud that he perpetrated on plaintiff.263
Defendant’s fraudulent conduct—when purporting to buy the
lottery ticket from plaintiff—did not place plaintiff’s title to the
lottery ticket at issue.264  On the contrary, the courts did not per-
mit the defendant to legally challenge the purity of plaintiff’s title
to either the lottery ticket or to the car.265  Such a challenge by
defendant was beyond his legal reach.266  This legal challenge was
beyond defendant’s grasp because substantively, plaintiff’s suit
against him was predicated solely upon defendant’s own fraudu-
lent misrepresentations alone.267
Plaintiff’s suit against him was based substantively upon
defendant’s meretricious conduct, consisting of his dishonor of his
obligations to pay the check that he tendered to plaintiff for the
purchase of the lottery ticket.268  At common law, the moral turpi-
tude implicated in the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations
was much too perturbing for the court to ignore or overlook.  In
essence, the defendant’s conduct was the greater of the two evils
and was therefore legally unforgivable.269
[ii] Legal Validity of Prizes Based Upon a Combination of
Both Skill and Chance
With respect to “hole-in-one” competitions at golf tourna-
ments, such tournaments do not necessarily constitute illegal lot-
teries at all.270  An example of an unenforceable agreement exists










270. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 397 So.2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1981) (“[T]here are
three elements to a lottery: (1) A prize, (2) awarded by chance, (3) for a
consideration.”) (citation omitted).
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and has agreed that—contingent upon the happening of a certain
specified event governed exclusively by chance—a prize will be
paid to the promisee by the promisor.271  However, in circum-
stances where chance is not the dominant factor in the happening
of the contingent event, an enforceable contractual right can arise
in the context of a tournament.272  It is not simply a question of
whether there is the presence of a consideration paid by a prom-
isee to a promisor, combined with the promise by the promisor of
the award of a prize to the promisee.273
Therefore, in instances where a promisee’s performance of an
act is bargained for by a promisor—as the agreed exchange for a
prize promised to be awarded by the promisor, on the occurrence
of a specified event—some elements of chance may conceivably
play a role in the happening of the specified event that is the con-
tingency which triggers the payment of a prize.274  However, the
presence of an element of chance does not per se convert the agree-
ment between the parties into an illegal lottery.275
For example, in Chenard v. Marcel Motors,276 an automobile
dealership was invited by a golf club in Maine to donate an auto-
mobile as a prize at one of the golf club’s tournaments.277  The
automobile dealership complied in order to promote its own busi-
ness interests278 and advertised the applicable terms for winning
the automobile.279  These terms were sent to potential tournament
participants and were also posted at the golf club and required
any golfer in the tournament to make a successful hole-in-one
drive at a specifically designated hole.280  On the tournament day,
the automobile dealership arranged for a new vehicle to be driven
271. See e.g. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 754-755 (N.Y. 1904) (“[The court]
concluded that the [scheme did] not depend exclusively on chance, but, to some extent
at least, [it was] affected by the exercise of judgment, and . . . therefore, the scheme did
not constitute a lottery. ‘Pure chance’ is . . . ‘the entire absence of all means of
calculating results,’ and . . . to constitute a lottery, it is necessary that the distribution
should be purely by chance, without any other element affecting the result . . . .”)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
272. See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961) (“The test
of the character of a game is not whether it contains an element of chance or an
element of skill, but which is the dominating element.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
273. See e.g., Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978).
274. Id.
275. Id.





\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL108.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-FEB-14 9:48
126 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
to the golf club and parked near the golf clubhouse, with one of the
automobile dealership’s advertisements conspicuously placed on
the new vehicle.281
Plaintiff paid the tournament fee, required by the golf club
and registered for the tournament.282  In the presence of his three
playing partners, plaintiff succeeded in making a hole-in-one drive
at the designated hole and claimed the new car as his prize by
notifying the automobile dealership.283 Plaintiff successfully sued
the dealership when it refused to deliver the new car as adver-
tised,284 and the dealership appealed the Superior Court’s refusal
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.285  The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court for four
reasons.286
First, plaintiff’s payment of an entrance fee to participate in
the golf tournament was lawful and did not convert the golf tour-
nament into an illegal wager or lottery.287  The Court concluded
that the entrance fees paid by tournament participants neither
comprised nor contributed to a “purse” for the purchase of the new
automobile.  Nor did any of the funds from the entrance fees con-
stitute or contribute to any prize to be won by any of the tourna-
ment participants.288
Second, the automobile dealership was not a participant in
the golf tournament and did not compete for the new automobile
at all. Moreover, the dealership did not derive any profit or legally
identifiable opportunity for profit from entrance fees paid by tour-
nament participants.289  In fact, all tournament entrance fees were
paid to the golf club as the contracting party with each tourna-
ment participant.290  Furthermore, the golf club was not in con-
tractual privity with the automobile dealership at all.291  Instead,
the automobile dealership had provided the new automobile to the
golf club gratuitously and temporarily.292  Therefore, the provision




285. Id.  Plaintiff’s appeal was based upon anti-gambling and anti-lottery statutes
that were in effect in the State of Maine’s laws at the time of the tournament.





291. See generally Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978).
292. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL108.txt unknown Seq: 37 12-FEB-14 9:48
2013] LOTTERIES AND PUBLIC POLICY 127
and placement of the new automobile at the golf club comprised an
integral part of a completely separate contract between the auto-
mobile dealer and each of the golf tournament participants.293
Third, the tournament golfers paid their entrance fees
directly to the golf club as consideration for the creation of a valid
contract in which chance was not the dominant factor.294  Tourna-
ment golfers were not risking their entrance fees as a mechanism
for making a return on their money as is done in any illegal
wagering transaction.295  Neither the cumulative total of the
entrance fee monies nor any fraction of it was divided among the
golfers as is done in an office “pool.”296
Fourth, none of the entrance fee money formed any part of the
value of the car as a prize.297  On the contrary, the automobile was
offered exclusively by the automobile dealership to each tourna-
ment golfer as a prize for the formation of a “unilateral” con-
tract.298  Plaintiff accepted this offer when he successfully shot the
hole-in-one at the designated hole at the golf tournament.299
Although it may be argued that successfully achieving a hole in
one implicates some element of chance,300 it was not the dominant
element, so there was no violation of Maine’s lottery or gambling
laws,301 nor was Maine’s public policy violated.302
VI. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LOTTERIES IN THE U.S.
AND THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
The following history refers almost exclusively to the history
and development of lotteries in the U.S. because the U.S. earned
its independence from Great Britain303 almost two hundred years,
before any Commonwealth Caribbean territory achieved indepen-
dence.304  Therefore, autonomous government in the Common-






298. See generally Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 599. See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev.
1961).
301. Chenard, 387 A.2d at 601.
302. Id.
303. See generally FRIEDMAN,  supra note 35; see also POSNER, supra note 35 at 146.
304. See Alexis, supra note 36.
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beginning in the 1960s.305  Prior to this time, the history of lotter-
ies the U.S. is extensive and volatile as chronicled below.
A. The Roller-Coaster Rise, Fall and Rise Again in
the History and Development of Lotteries in the
U.S.306 and the Commonwealth Caribbean’s
Limited Experience in this Regard.
Gambling is versatile307 and has an extensive and somewhat
turbulent history in human affairs.308  In modern times, lotteries
are probably the most prevalent form of gambling in the United
States309 and also in the Commonwealth Caribbean.310  Both gam-
bling in general and lotteries in particular have long histories in
the U.S. and abroad.311  The drawing of lots may conceivably be
the most ancient form of the use of chance to impact particular
outcomes312 and it has been proposed that games of chance existed
305. See Sir Roy Marshall, supra note 130, at 1–2 (“Before independence the
sovereignty of a country is subject to a number legal constraints, particularly in
relation to the conduct of its own . . . financial affairs.”) (emphasis added).
306. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 488 (Fla. 1935) (“Lotteries are of
ancient origin. They were common in the festivals of Roman emperors, were used by
the feudal princes of Europe, by the court of Louis XIV, and were appropriated in the
Italian republics of the sixteenth century to encourage the sale of merchandise. They
early became popular in France, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland as a means of
raising government funds. They were established in England as early as 1569, and
were one of her most popular sources of revenue. They were at one time employed in
every state of the Union and in the District of Columbia to raise money for public
purposes, the erection of buildings, making public improvements, for educational and
sometimes for religious purposes. In 1828 the territorial Legislature of Florida
created Union Academy in Jackson county and  authorized its trustees to raise $1,000
for its benefit by lottery. . . . During the Revolution the Continental Congress on one
occasion authorized the raising of funds by lottery.”) (citations omitted).
307. See Kelly, supra note 66, at 90 (“Gambling can take a nearly infinite number of
forms, and each State generally has the freedom to decide whether to legalize any form
of gambling.”) (emphasis added).
308. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE supra note 9, at 33–34. See also
NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“[M]aking decisions and determining fates by the
casting of lots has a long record in human history (including several instances in the
Bible). . . .”). See e.g. HOLY BIBLE, KING JAMES VERSION, (Barbour Publishing Inc.
2002) [hereinafter HOLY BIBLE] Leviticus 16:8;  Joshua 18:6;  First Samuel 14:42;
Proverbs 16:33;  First Chronicles 26:13.
309. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“The lottery industry stands out in
the gambling industry. . . . It is the most widespread form of gambling in the
U.S. . . .”).
310. See About Us, BETTING, GAMING & LOTTERIES COMMISSION supra note 23; see
also Gov’t Continues to Lapse on Deposit of Lotto Funds, supra note 26.
311. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 32. See also
HERRMANN supra note 77, at 9 (“The earliest widespread legal gambling activity in
the United States was the lottery.”).
312. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1.
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in antiquity.313  The “drawing of lots” probably constitutes the
most numerous references to “gambling” in the Holy Bible.314
[i] The Rise
[a] Lotteries in the American and Commonwealth
Caribbean Colonial Period
In ancient times in Europe, initially, lotteries seemed to have
been occasionally included in private celebrations.315  Later, the
commercial potential was recognized,316 leading to the use of lot-
teries by merchants to get rid of excess accumulations of merchan-
dise that went unsold for overly long periods.317  Governmental
awareness of the prospective use of lotteries also became evi-
dent,318 especially the potential use of lotteries to raise revenue.319
Governments are as adept as anyone else in appreciating the com-
paratively painless impact of the use of lotteries320 for the purpose
of raising its revenue rather than by involuntary taxation.321
Even more specific to the North American history of lotteries,
one of the first lotteries was held in 1612 in London to benefit the
early Virginia Colony in America.322  However, the Virginia Col-
313. See Ronald L. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs:  A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 15 (1992) [hereinafter:
Rychlack] (“Gambling activity has certainly been prevalent for a long time.  Various
games of chance existed among ancient Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrews,
Greeks, Romans and the early Germanic Tribes.”) (citation omitted).
314. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1.
315. See Rychlack, supra note 313.
316. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he use [of] lotteries for material
gain is of more recent origin, although of considerable antiquity.”).
317. Or stock that proved difficult to dispose of. See Rychlack, supra note 313, at
21.
318. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“The first recorded public lottery in
the West was held during the reign of Augustus Caesar for municipal repairs in
Rome.”).
319. Sources are not unanimous with regard to accurately identifying the date of
the first lottery or the first use of lotteries to raise governmental revenue.
320. When compared to that other less attractive governmental mechanism of
involuntary taxation and its potential political impact. See A Summary of the 1765
Stamp Act, supra note 3.
321. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“The first recorded lottery to
distribute prize money was held in 1466 . . . in what is now Belgium, for the
announced purpose of providing assistance to the poor.”). But see also CLOTFELTER &
COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 34 (“The first lotteries offering prizes of money
was held in Florence in 1530, with proceeds going to the state.”) (citation omitted).
322. See NIBERT, supra note 107, at 19 (“In 1612, James I, the king of England,
granted the Virginia Company a charter that permitted the establishment of a lottery
to fund the struggling colony.”); see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 24. See also
NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 1 (“Lotteries held a prominent place in the early
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ony’s gain was the British public’s loss,323 which predictably led to
termination of these lotteries in due course.324  Of course, domestic
American colonial lotteries soon replaced the British ones.325
Thereafter, lotteries became more popular in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries in North America.326  At this time, the
Commonwealth Caribbean territories were still colonies of Great
Britain.327 Both the government and private parties used lotteries
during this period in colonial America, however, private lotteries
were not legal.328  Banking institutions and similar financial
mechanisms were not fully developed in the American or Com-
monwealth Caribbean colonies in this era.329  In the absence of
history of America, including an important role in financing the establishment of the
first English colonies.”); see also SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 15.
323. Essentially because the profits benefitted the British colonies in North
America rather than the British public at home in Britain. See NIBERT, supra note
107, at 19 (“By 1620, lottery proceeds provided almost half the revenues necessary for
this colonial undertaking.”) (citation omitted). See also Rychlack, supra note 313, at
24.
324. Id.; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 6 (“In 1620, the House of Commons
ordered the Virginia Company to stop selling tickets since the company’s lotteries
were competing with [English] government lotteries that were not bringing in the
amount of revenue that legislators had expected.”).
325. See Rychlack, supra note 313; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE,
supra note 9, at 34 (“In colonial America lotteries were a popular and common means
of financing public projects. . . All of the colonies authorized lotteries at one time or
another, and a few of them used the device on many occasions.”).
326. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 6–8. See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8,
at 1; see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 25–29.  In this colonial era, the West Indies’
commercial significance to British capitalism was almost inestimable. See, e.g.,
WILLIAMS: CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY, supra note 6, at 54 (“The amazing value
of [the] West Indian colonies can more graphically be presented by comparing
individual West Indian islands with individual mainland colonies. In 1697 . . . Little
Barbados, with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New
England, New York and Pennsylvania combined.”) (emphasis added); see also,
CARIBBEAN ISLANDS: A COUNTRY STUDY, WASH.: GPO FOR LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THE
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS (Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1987)
available at http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/6.htm (“[However] [b]y 1750
Jamaica was the most important of Britain’s Caribbean colonies, having eclipsed
Barbados in economic significance.”).
327. WILLIAMS: CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY, supra note 6, at 121 (“The commerce of
the West India Islands,” wrote Adams, “is a part of the American system of commerce.
They can neither do without us, nor we without them.  The creator has placed us upon
the globe in such a situation that we have occasion for each other.”) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
328. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 34 (“In colonial
America lotteries were a popular and common means of financing public projects.
Lotteries run for private profit also existed but were never legalized. “) (emphasis
added) .
329. Rychlack, supra note 313, at 31; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE,
supra note 9, at 35 (“Neither debt finance nor taxation appeared to be an attractive
alternative for the financing of large capital projects.  Capital markets were
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such institutional sources of capital for major projects “[a]ll of the
[American] colonies authorized lotteries at one time or another,
and a few of them used the device on many occasions.”330  Building
projects for both public and private use, such as canals, bridges,
and roads were funded through the use of lotteries.331  This
included construction projects for a number of colleges,332 includ-
ing “Harvard, Yale, King’s College (Columbia University),
Princeton, Dartmouth, Rhode Island College (Brown University),
the University of Pennsylvania, the University of North Carolina
and the University of Michigan . . ..”.333
The modern “public/private” distinctions had not yet crystal-
lized in the law.334  However, the lotteries that operated during
this era did so outside of government supervision and were not
legalized.335  Predictably, some lotteries were adapted to charitable
uses.336  Additionally, some colonies and later some states used lot-
teries to support military activities during both the French and
Indian Wars of the eighteenth century.337  Lotteries were also used
during the Revolutionary War era338 and the Continental Congress
authorized at least one lottery “to support the Continental Army
in 1776 . . . .”339
[b] Lotteries after American Independence
After American Independence, lotteries grew in popularity.340
Apparently, Thomas Jefferson, in 1810, initially opposed lotteries
“however laudable or desirable [their] object[s] may be.”341  How-
rudimentary, to say the least, before a national banking system had been firmly
established.”) (emphasis added).
330. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE supra note 9, at 34.
331. Id.
332. Id; see also NIBERT, supra note 107, at 21.
333. See Rychlack, supra note 313, at 25.
334. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 34 (“[T]he line
between public and private was typically indistinct.”).
335. Id. (“Lotteries run for private profit also existed but were never legalized.”).
336. Id. at 35.
337. See NIBERT, supra note 107, at 22 (“The global struggles for empire that
embroiled the colonists in the French and Indian War also brought considerable
hardship and expense, and lotteries were used to subsidize colonial war-related
activities.”).
338. Id. at 22-23; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 34
(“During the Revolution lotteries were used to supply and support troops in the field
. . . .”).
339. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 36. See also
MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 10.
340. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 35.
341. Id. at 299.
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ever, he apparently changed his mind in 1826 when he suffered
financial setbacks and as a result needed funds to meet the needs
of his personal estate.342  He hoped to persuade the Virginia legis-
lature to permit him to operate a lottery for this purpose.343  In his
later years, he changed his opinion regard lotteries completely,
stating that lotteries constituted a “painless tax, paid only by the
willing.”344
The prevalence of lotteries increased in the early decades of
the nineteenth century.345  In 1832, income received from sales of
lottery tickets constituted three percent of the national income.346
In fact, “[t]he distinguishing feature of nineteenth-century lotter-
ies was the emergence of [private] firms specializing in organiza-
tion and marketing.  The number of dealers selling tickets as a
primary activity increased.”347
Due in part to the emergence of fraud and dishonesty in the
operation of lotteries,348 opposition to lotteries materialized and
progressively increased.349  It has been suggested that the reform
movement led by President Andrew Jackson intensified and
sharpened opposition to lottery operations altogether.350  The lack
of strict regulations and the presence of overly lax controls con-
tributed to scandals in a number of lottery operations.351  Curbs on
lotteries followed and in 1833 individual states started to enact
statutes prohibiting lotteries.352
The Civil War era and its economic devastation of the Ameri-
can South stimulated a number of states to reconsider lotteries for
statewide financial relief.353  The defeat of the southern states and
342. Id.; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 9.
343. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 299. See also
MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 9.
344. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 299.
345. See id. at 36 (“Between 1790 and 1833, for example, Pennsylvania authorized
sixty lotteries to benefit church groups, including Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal,
Reformed, Baptist, Catholic, Universalist, and Jewish congregations.”).
346. Id. at 35 (“At the same time, there was little organized opposition to lotteries as
a means of raising money.) (emphasis added).
347. Id. (emphasis added).
348. Id. (“Whether as a result of the entrance of private enterprise into lottery
business or as an accompanying trend, there was increasing evidence of fraud and
dishonesty in the operation of lotteries.”) (emphasis added).
349. Id. at 37.
350. Id.
351. Id.; see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 9-10.
352. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 37  (“First the
northeastern states, then the southern and western states abolished lotteries until by
1860, only three states—Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky—still allowed them.”).
353. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14.
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the need for reconstruction played a major role in these difficult
financial times.354  Some southern states therefore used lotteries to
raise revenue during this period of depressed governmental reve-
nues caused by the Civil War.355  The Louisiana lottery became
probably the largest of them all,356 until it too was later
eliminated.357
[ii] The Fall of Legal Lotteries358
With regard to legally operated lotteries, the Louisiana expe-
rience is the most vivid example of the fall of legal lotteries.  In
this respect, discussion and analysis of lotteries in this section
relates to the demise of lotteries in the U.S. until they were legally
resurrected almost a century later.359  It is acknowledged that
after the fall discussed in this section, illegal lottery operations
survived in many parts of the country during the almost seventy
year period when lotteries were banned in the U.S.360
[a] Louisiana’s Lottery Experience
The regulation of gambling activity, including the operation of
lotteries, is a species of morality policy,361 and therefore falls under
the individual states’ “police powers under the 10th Amendment
354. Id.; see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 10 (“There was a brief revival of
state-run lotteries in the 1860s. Expenses stemming from the Civil War and
Reconstruction created a great need for funds to finance government projects
primarily in Southern and Western states.”).
355. See Rychlack, supra note 313, at 10.
356. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 9, at 38 (“[O]ver 90 percent of its revenue [came] from out of state.”).
See also SWEENY, supra note 114, at 55 (“By some estimates. . . the Octopus brought in
as much as $30 million a year from customers, more than 90 percent of whom lived in
other states.”).
357. See NIBERT, supra note 107, at 30 (“By the end of the [nineteenth] century the
Louisiana lottery was effectively ended, as was virtually all lottery activity in the
[U.S.]”).
358. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 37 (“[T]he reformers
prevailed, with states first and eventually the federal government stepping in to
outlaw lotteries by the end of the nineteenth century.”).
359. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 15  (“In 1964, New Hampshire became the
first state to operate a [legal] lottery in almost seventy years.”).
360. Id; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 39 (“Illegal
lotteries existed alongside official lotteries from at least the nineteenth century . . .  In
the United States the two dominant illegal games have been policy and numbers.”)
(emphasis added). See also SWEENY, supra note 114, at 66.
361. See Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (U.S.,1879); see also
HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 17 (“[G]ambling is among the various morality policies
placed within the [individual states’] jurisdiction by the police powers under the 10th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”) (emphasis added).
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to the U.S. Constitution.”362 In the 1860s, the federal government
began to consider legislation to bar lotteries from using the federal
mail system as a result of growing national opposition to lotteries
because the federal government has no express or implied consti-
tutional power to regulate gambling.363  As the efforts opposing lot-
teries intensified, Louisiana lawmakers decided to charter a
private company to run its lottery in 1868.364 The individual states
have legal power generally to regulate lotteries within the borders
of each state.365  Nevertheless, the efforts by States other than
Louisiana to bolster state revenues from lotteries were less than
stellar and by the end of the Civil War era, only the Louisiana
Lottery legally survived366 into the 1890s.367  This development left
the Louisiana lottery with a very profitable monopoly position in
the U.S.368
The Louisiana lottery survived because two private brokers
acquired the charter for the lottery from the State of Louisiana.369
These two private brokers then hired two retired Confederate
generals to oversee the lottery drawings and to promote a nation-
wide campaign to popularize drawings.370  “[I]t was truly the first
national lottery held on a weekly basis”371 and the mails were used
to purchase and sell tickets.372  When the expiration date of the
362. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 17.
363. See Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (U.S.,1879); see also
HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 17; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 15.
364. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14.
365. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 4 (“Gambling policy is largely, although not
entirely, state policy. . . .  [M]ost gambling policy regulation falls within the rubric of
the “police powers” clause of the 10th Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
366. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 38; see, e.g., SWEENEY
supra note 114, at 47 (“Only the Louisiana Lottery, approved in 1868, would thrive.”).
367. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 14–15.
368. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14; see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 11
(“Because its books were kept secret . . . it has been estimated that at its height of
popularity, the Louisiana lottery was a nationwide monopoly making annual profits
of up to $13 million. . . .”) (citations omitted).
369. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14; see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 11
(“From the beginning, the Louisiana Lottery was run by a New York gambling
syndicate. To lend an air of respectability, two former confederate generals . . . were
hired to oversee the drawings.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
370. See Rychlack, supra note 313, at 11.
371. See Rychlack, supra note 313, at 11; see also SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 54
(“The Louisiana Lottery was known as the Octopus because its arms reached into
every state and city.”); see also Rychlack, supra note 313, at 11 (“[T]he Louisiana
Lottery [was] also known as “The Serpent.”) (citation omitted). See also MCGOWAN,
supra note 12, at 14 (“[T]he Louisiana lottery . . . [was] known as the Serpent . . . .”).
372. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 14. (“More than $3 million was distributed to
winners annually, while profits for the brokers averaged between $3 and $5 million.”).
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lottery charter approached, one of the private brokers sought a
renewal by offering the State of Louisiana a sum of $1 million a
year.373
This entrepreneurial approach was reported nationally
throughout the U.S. and evidently backfired.374  The resulting
national publicity generated—or contributed to the generation
of—extensive national opposition to the Louisiana lottery and pre-
cipitated action by a number of state legislatures around the U.S.
to pass resolutions urging Congress and the President to termi-
nate Louisiana’s lottery.375  In light of barriers presented by the
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ,376  the federal govern-
ment responded by enacting a number of statutes calculated to
block the use of the federal mails that had facilitated the sale of
tickets outside the state of Louisiana.377 In actuality, these initial
statutory provisions were too weak and therefore failed to accom-
plish their statutory goal;378 however, a later federal statute
enacted in 1890 provided the coup de grace to the Louisiana lot-
tery by terminating its use of the federal mail system.379  Subse-
quent Louisiana state efforts to renew the lottery failed as well.380
Thus, in 1893, after some twenty-five years of operation,381 Louisi-
ana finally joined the rest of the U.S. in banning lotteries.382
Thereupon, the lottery syndicate moved its operations to Hon-
373. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 15.
374. Id. (The Governor of Louisiana had denounced the first offer, presented by one
of the founders of the lottery—ostensibly made to be used to assist in funding the
construction of levees along the banks of the Mississippi river—as a bribe and the
founder had then doubled the offer to $1 million a year).
375. See MCGOWAN, supra note 12, at 15 (The Louisiana lottery was certainly a
drain on the financial resources of other states by siphoning up to $5 million per year
from other states into Louisiana). See e.g. SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 47 (“New York
[had] banned lotteries in 1833.  The Pennsylvania legislature soon followed,
prohibiting lotteries after December 31, 1834. . . .  Nine states had stopped holding
lotteries by 1835.  The rest would follow suit over the next several decades. . . . By the
start of the Civil War nearly every state in the country had repudiated the lottery.”)
(emphasis added).
376. See Stone v. State of Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (U.S.,1879); see also
HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 17.
377. See U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421-422 (1993); see MCGOWAN,
supra note 12, at 15.
378. See Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 421-22.
379. Id.
380. See SWEENEY supra note 114, at 59 (“The Louisiana Lottery[‘s] . . . dream of
another twenty-five year run was dashed by a popular vote that went against it,
157,422 to 4,225. The voters of Louisiana exiled the Octopus.”)
381. Id. at 55
382. Id. at 59.
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duras383 and began “printing and distributing tickets in the United
States, using private mail couriers.”384 However, in 1895 Congress
responded by deftly closing this loophole in the law385 and this fed-
eral legislation finally ended the Louisiana Lottery in 1895.386
[b] North Dakota’s Lottery Experience
North Dakota’s experience relating to the former Louisiana
lottery is intriguing.387  Subsequent to its ouster from Louisiana,
the then defunct Louisiana lottery company sought to relocate to
the state of North Dakota.388 However, unhelpful practices389
tainted by corruption were employed in North Dakota in an
attempt to successfully relocate the lottery there.390 These prac-
tices included making payments to some legislators in an effort to
garner legislative support for relocating the lottery there.391 Unfor-
tunately, these practices were discovered and publicized by the
Pinkerton Detective Agency, privately hired by the North Dakota
Governor.392
Therefore, although a bill supporting the relocation of the lot-
tery in North Dakota was successfully passed in the State Senate,
it was indefinitely postponed in the House on publication of the
corrupt practices that were used by the lottery supporters.393 The
disclosures of corruption led to political upheaval in North
Dakota, triggering the enactment of an amendment to the North
Dakota Constitution prohibiting lotteries there.394 The aftershocks
383. Id. (“The company pulled stakes for Honduras, renaming itself the Honduras
National Lottery.”)
384. Id.
385. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-1 (“The federal government
outlawed the use of the mail for lotteries in 1890 and, in 1895, invoked the Commerce
Clause to forbid shipments of lottery tickets or advertisements across state lines,
effectively ending all lotteries in the United States.”); see also NGISC: Lotteries, supra
note 8, at 2; see also SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59 (“Congress responded in 1895 by
making the interstate trafficking of lottery materials a crime.”); see also NIBERT,
supra note 107, at 30.
386. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 38.
387. See Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262, 272 (N.D. 2001) (Sandstrom, J.,
dissenting).
388. Id.
389. Somewhat similar to those used earlier in Louisiana. See, e.g., SWEENEY supra
note 114, at 59 (“The Louisiana Lottery’s barely concealed bribery and corruption of
government and courts made lotteries a pariah in most state legislatures.”).
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of this traumatic political revulsion still reverberate in North
Dakota today.395 In the aftermath of that historical upheaval, the
prohibition on lotteries remains embedded in the North Dakota
Constitution396 and in the State’s statutory enactments.397 In fact,
in the modern era, “in only one state—North Dakota—has the
public consistently voted against a lottery.”398
Statewide political opposition persists to the present day.399
Indeed, a recently proposed amendment to the North Dakota con-
stitution—purporting to authorize a state lottery predicated on
alleviating the tax burden on the citizens of North Dakota400—was
defeated in the 1986 general election.401
In contrast, North Dakota has repealed an earlier ban on lot-
tery advertising, provided that such advertisements relate to lot-
teries that are legal in the particular states in which they
operate.402 This legislative measure was recently cited—in addi-
tion to other factors—by a dissenting Justice in the North Dakota
Supreme Court as evidence of a purported statewide political
change of heart.403 The Justice argued that “North Dakota’s legali-
zation of advertising of out-of-state lotteries cannot be reconciled
with the majority’s claimed public policy against [lotteries].”404
[iii] The Rise Again
Legal lotteries returned to the U.S. with the passage of New
Hampshire legislation in 1964.405 However, once they returned,
395. Id.
396. See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 266 (“[The North Dakota] state constitution
expressly forbids lotteries and games of chance unless the entire net proceeds are
devoted to public-spirited uses statutorily specified as educational, charitable,
patriotic, fraternal, and religious. N.D. Const. art. XI, § 25 . . . .”).
397. Id. at 267 (“N.D. C.C. § 12.1-28-02(2) . . . criminalizes sales, purchases, receipt,
or transfer of lottery chances, comprehensively forbids such activities whether the
lottery is in state or out of state. By express terms, the statute prohibits these
activities even if the lottery is legal in the other state or country.”).
398. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 3; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 9, at 146 (“The only state to turn down a state-run lottery is North
Dakota, where voters said no in 1986 and again in 1988.”).
399. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 3; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 9, at 146 (“The only state to turn down a state-run lottery is North
Dakota, where voters said no in 1986 and again in 1988.”).
400. Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262, 268 (N.D. 2001).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 273 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
403. Id.
404. Id. (emphasis added).
405. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 9, at 22  (“Beginning in New Hampshire in 1964, the lottery
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legal lotteries proliferated with a vengeance and by the end of
1988 they had spread to thirty-three states plus the District of
Columbia.406 In order to accomplish legalization, “[v]irtually every
state has required approval by both the legislature and the public
in a referendum. . . .”407 Of all the fifty American states, North
Dakota alone has repeatedly rejected the enactment of lottery
legislation.408
In this modern era, both state and provincial governments
have come to rely very heavily on lottery revenue for a number of
purposes.409 Supporters of legal lotteries emphasize the general
public welfare as the most significant beneficiary.410 Dissenters
tend to question the validity of such claims.411 Nevertheless, over
the past multiple decades, lotteries have provided a steady flow of
revenue into public coffers with some states purporting to
earmark a percentage of lottery proceeds for specific educational
uses.412
In the context of public policy, some dissenters lament about
“public policy being made piecemeal and incrementally, with little
or no general overview.”413 Of course, the question that may be
asked—in this context—is: Well, what’s wrong with such an
approach?414  One answer may be that the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission does not seem to be convinced that the
approach of incremental and piecemeal development with little or
no general overview is the optimal one.415 The Commission per-
movement spread to New York and other northeastern states before jumping to the
West and Midwest. By 1989 lotteries were operating in every section of the country.”).
406. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 23. As of 2011, this
number had risen to 40. See RICHARD A. LEITER, 0020 SURVEYS 21, at 1 (West 2011)
(“Forty states permit lotteries.”).
407. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added).
408. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 3; see also The North Dakota Experience
supra Section VI [ii][b].
409. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 5.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 6 (“One state which has recently addressed this problem is Georgia. In
establishing its lottery in 1994 . . . the sole designated recipients are programs for
college scholarships, pre-kindergarten classes, and technology for classrooms; it is
illegal to use the funds for any other purpose.”).
413. Id.
414. One commentator has perceived certain consequences as a result of this
incremental development. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 121 (“Gambling policies
have developed incrementally; once made legal, most forms of gambling have been
quietly expanded, and regulations that could limit growth have been loosened.”)
(Emphasis added).
415. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 13.
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ceives a piecemeal approach as one that places “pressures on the
lottery officials” for a number of reasons articulated in the Com-
mission’s Final Report.416
In the opinion of the Commission, inevitably, these factors
have had an unavoidably significant impact on the public policy of
every state that has so ardently embraced lotteries.417  Moreover,
two nationally prominent lottery commentators seem to share this
viewpoint.418  However, apparently, the two commentators have
not finally concluded that the absence of a coherent overall gam-
bling policy is fatally flawed.419 Nor does it seem that, in their
opinion, the absence of a specific lottery policy is necessarily the
most significant factor that should control or impact lottery
approval.420
One may propose that this widespread governmental finan-
cial dependence upon lottery revenue is not an ideal societal equi-
librium. It is, arguably, not an equilibrium at all.  It continues to
be evolutionary but it is certainly of unknown permanence.
Instead, it may even constitute an imbalance by virtue of its allo-
cation of too much power to the lottery industry. The balance of
societal power is probably healthier where a more appropriate
impact of the opinions of elected officials is present. This configur-
ation of power in decision-making could be more healthy for the
public policy of any common law democratic society overall. This
would arguably be healthier than the presence of an industry-
driven policy juggernaut. Such an aggregation of power when
leveraged against elected officials can reach a tipping point421
416. Id. (“Authority . . . is divided between the legislature and executive branches
and further fragmented within each, with the result that the general public welfare is
taken into consideration only intermittently, if at all.”) (emphasis added).
417. Id. (“Few, if any states, have a coherent ‘gambling policy’ or even a ‘lottery
policy.’  Policy decisions taken in the establishment of a lottery are soon overcome by
the ongoing evolution of the industry.  It is often the case that public officials inherit
policies and a dependency on revenues that they can do little or nothing about.”).
418. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 43 (“One reason to
believe that familiarity itself may mollify opposition is the apparent rise in approval
of lotteries in states following adoption.”) (emphasis added).
419. Id. (“[T]he major share of the increasing acceptance of lotteries in the United
States must surely be due to . . . factors, which might be contained under the rubric of
the general liberalization of attitudes on social and moral questions in society.  The
‘erosion of traditional (i.e., small-town) American values’ is frequently referred to in
analyses of social change, and there is in fact evidence of significant change on a
number of fronts.”) (citations omitted).
420. Id.
421. See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 247 (2000) (“The theory of
Tipping Points requires . . . that we reframe the way we think about the world.”)
(emphasis added).
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relating to significant decision-making in the context of public
policy.
There is also a more recent development where a number of
individual states in the U.S. cooperate by banding together in
order to offer bigger overall jackpot prizes.422 This development
can also assist states with small populations, essentially those
States with populations that acting alone may be too small to sup-
port an in-state lottery.  By banding together, such states can
share in lottery-generated funds along with other U.S. states with
larger population sizes.423 In fact, the first multistate lottery
included New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont.424 This turned out
to be a precursor to the largest modern-day American multi-state
lottery games of Powerball425 and Mega Millions.426
VII. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON LOTTERIES
Gambling policy is the prerogative of state governments
because of the fundamental structure of delegated powers under
the U.S. Constitution.427 Moreover, the legislative powers dele-
gated to Congress in Article I, Section 8,428 do not expressly
include the regulation of gambling activity.  Furthermore, the
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has specifically man-
dated that the “powers not delegated to the United States . . . nor
prohibited . . . to the states, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”429 Accordingly, the federal government
refrained from efforts to regulate gambling for nearly a century.430
422. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 17 (“In recent years, the figures for the
top prize have continued to increase as multi-state consortia have been formed with a
joint jackpot.”).
423. See SWEENEY supra note 114, at 98.
424. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 113.
425. A multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State Lottery Association (MUSL) that
includes thirty-two states and Washington D.C. See FAQ & History, POWERBALL,
http://www.powerball.com/pb_info.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
426. A multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State Lottery Association (MUSL) that
includes forty-three states, U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington D.C. See History of
the Game, MEGAMILLIONS, available at http://www.megamillions.com/about-us
427. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206 (2009)
(“The government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority
is defined and limited by the Constitution. All powers not granted to it by that
instrument are reserved to the States or the people.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
428. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
429. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
430. In 1988, acting under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3, the Indian Commerce
Clause, Congress enacted the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) imposing
on the several States a federal statutory obligation to negotiate compacts in good faith
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This self-imposed congressional restraint was apparently a
function of a particular interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In
this era, Congress did not seem to perceive the Commerce Clause
as an enabling constitutional source of legal regulatory power. A
small number of exceptions did indeed exist.431
Congress has certainly been assigned the constitutional
power to “establish post offices”432 and under the Commerce
Clause to “regulate commerce . . . among the several States”433 So,
ultimately, Congress’ perception of the potential constitutional
regulatory power embedded in those expressly enumerated pow-
ers changed over time. This change was significantly influenced
by concerns emanating from potentially illegal lotteries. The Loui-
siana Lottery served as a catalyst for implementing these federal
legislative powers. As a result, the use of the mails for lottery
facilitation was the chosen mechanism to legally eliminate the
interstate activities of the Louisiana Lottery.434
In 1876, President Grant signed into law an act imposing
legal sanctions upon persons using the mails to circulate advertis-
ing for lotteries through the mails.435 Then in 1890, an act was
passed proscribing publication—in newspapers—of advertise-
ments for lotteries.436 At this time, managers of the Louisiana Lot-
tery may have tried to find lacuna in the law that they could
legally utilize and probably finding none, the Louisiana Lottery
managers moved lottery operations outside the U.S. to Hondu-
with the Indian Tribes relating to gaming activities.  Congress also created a federal
cause of action empowering Indian Tribes to compel States by action brought in the
federal courts to perform those duties.  However, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) the U.S. Supreme Court struck down this grant of jurisdiction to sue a
State without its consent.  The U.S. Supreme Court also made it abundantly clear
that these provisions of IGRA could not be validly used to enforce certain statutory
provisions of IGRA against a state official. See, e.g., Steven Andrew Light, Kathryn
R.L. Rand, & Alan P. Meister, Spreading the Wealth:  Indian Gaming and Revenue-
Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D.L. REV. 657, 665 (2004) (“In effect, the Court invalidated
Congress’s carefully crafted compromise between state interests and tribal and
federal interests.”).
431. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 36 (“The only
exceptions . . . were a lottery to support the Continental Army in 1776 and a series of
lotteries approved by the federal government between 1792 and 1842 to fund projects
in the District of Columbia.”) (citation omitted).
432. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 7.
433. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
434. See supra note 432.
435. WILLIAM NORMAN THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 120 (2001).
436. Id.
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ras.437 Congress responded in 1894,438 by enacting legislation that
prohibited the importation “into the United States from any for-
eign country . . . [of] any lottery ticket or any advertisement of any
lottery.”439
Seizure and forfeiture of all such articles was statutorily com-
manded.440 Additionally, penalties of fines with a maximum of
$5,000 and imprisonment up to ten years, or both, were statuto-
rily empowered against violators.441 Then, in 1895,442 Congress
enacted an additional statute empowering the suppression of all
lottery traffic through national and interstate commerce.443 Use of
the mails was expressly prohibited in this act.444
The cumulative effect of these federal laws was ultimately
decisive as a result of the severity of the restrictions imposed upon
the operators of the Louisiana Lottery.  Additionally, Louisiana
citizens had apparently become aware of the bribing of state polit-
ical leaders and the extraction of exorbitant profits from operation
of the lottery.445 In contrast, state beneficiaries were apparently
less fortunate financially.446 Finally, in 1905, as a result of state-
wide pressure from citizens, the Louisiana legislature terminated
state sponsorship of the lottery.447
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions played a significant role in
this regard as well.448 The constitutionality of the congressional
enactments was sustained.449 The judiciary ruled that the perti-
437. See, e.g., SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59 (“When the [Louisiana Lottery]
company’s charter expired in 1894 . . . [t]he company pulled stakes for Honduras,
renaming itself the Honduras National Lottery.  The business continued printing and
distributing tickets in the [U.S.] using private mail couriers.”).




442. See e.g. SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59 (“Congress responded in 1895 by
making the interstate trafficking of lottery materials a crime.”).
443. 53rd Cong. Ch. 191.
444. Id.
445. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, Ch. 2 at 2-1; see also Sweeney supra
note 114, at 59.
446. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, Ch. 2 at 2-1; see also Sweeney supra
note 114, at 59.
447. See SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59 (“For a number of years the company
operated outside the law, until raids on these operations finally killed the Octopus in
1907.”); see also id. (“[A] popular vote . . . went against it, 157,422 to 4,225.”).
448. See THOMPSON, supra note 435, at 121(citing Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110
(1892); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)).
449. See Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903).
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nent acts of Congress were within the scope of the powers
assigned to Congress under the provisions of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.450 First, in 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in In re
Rapier,451 that the 1872 prohibition was a valid exercise of con-
gressional power to regulate the use of the mails.452 Then, in 1903,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Champion v. Ames453 that Con-
gress had the power to regulate a “species of interstate commerce”
that “has grown into disrepute and has become offensive to the
entire people of the nation.”454 These decisions were perhaps the
straws that finally and completely broke the back of the Louisiana
lottery.455
Although there were no other legal state-authorized or state-
operated lotteries until New Hampshire began its sweepstakes in
1964, there were other lotteries that sought markets in the United
States.456 In addition to illegal numbers games in all major Ameri-
can cities,457 the Irish Sweepstakes—created by the Irish Parlia-
ment in 1930—had significant participants in the United States
as well.458 At first, the mails were used to promote and sell tickets
to customers in the United States;459 however, the 1895 federal
law460 empowered the U.S. Post Office to intervene with legal
action to combat this use of the mails. Ultimately, any residual
success of the Irish Sweepstakes met with competition when
American states began to launch their own lotteries.
VIII. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY APPLICABLE TO
LOTTERIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
AND THE U.S.
[i] Commonwealth Caribbean
With respect to the judicial philosophy of judges in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean, two points of view may be mentioned.
450. See Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903).
451. Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
452. Id.
453. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
454. Id. at 328.
455. See SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59.
456. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 39.
457. See SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59.
458. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 38; see also SWEENEY
supra note 114, at 71.
459. See SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 59. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE,
supra note 9, at 38; see also SWEENEY, supra note 114, at 71.
460. See THOMPSON, supra note 435.
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First, there is the point of view that “[t]he commonplace adher-
ence of courts in the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean to
the decisions of the English courts is rooted in profound psycholog-
ical and jurisprudential considerations of colonial domination.”461
Secondly, this point of view resonates harmoniously with one com-
mentator’s view of the judiciary’s approach to precedent in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, where he observes that: “[t]he judicial
approach to the operation of precedent in the West Indies has
been rather assuming and mechanical . . . [and] closely associated
with a colonial tendency to assume that if it is English it is right,
irrespective of the theoretical or analytical implications.”462
Yet, the same commentator has expressed the opinion that
there is “the pervasive and persistent search for a West Indian
identity among West Indians [that] imbues decisions of courts in
the region with a socio-psychological content which make them
quite different from decisions of any other courts.“463 This com-
mentator’s apparently contradictory views may be reconciled by
viewing his first comments as addressing the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean judiciary’s approach to the doctrine of precedent,464
whereas his second comments465 address the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean judiciary’s approach to respecting non-Commonwealth
Caribbean court decisions as persuasive authority. The quest for
helpful persuasive authority located in decisions of other common
law court decisions is a substantive and autonomous one.
Moreover, acquisition by the Commonwealth Caribbean terri-
tories of independence from Great Britain dates from the 1960s.466
This has arguably empowered the judiciary of the Commonwealth
Caribbean territories to select the decisions of those common law
jurisdictions—that meet the needs of the particular controversy—
for emulation.467 This therefore suggests that the extensive experi-
461. See Dr. Winston Anderson, Double Renvoi and the Circulus Inextricabilis,
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES: A VOLUME OF ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE
THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST
INDIES 313 (Butterworths 1992); see also Rose-Marie B. Antoine, Opting out from the
Optional Protocol – Is this Humane? 3 CARIB. L. B. 37 (1998) (“The excessive and
voluntary reliance of Commonwealth Caribbean judges on English precedent . . .has
been well documented in Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence.”).
462. See A.D. Burgess, Judicial Precedent in the West Indies, 7 ANGLO-AM. L. R.
113, 135 (1978).
463. Id. at 114.
464. See id. at 135.
465. See id. at 114.
466. See sources cited supra note 36.
467. See, e.g., Honorable Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice:  A
Unique Institution of Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 171, 182 (2005)
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ence of the U.S. judiciary—particularly the rich sources of state
court decisions in relation to the adjudication of lottery controver-
sies—would be a ready and likely rich source of assistance when
needed.468
[ii] U.S.
In states where lotteries are expressly prohibited, constitu-
tional or statutory definitions of lotteries may not have been
included in the state’s constitution or its statutes.469 Nevertheless,
the definition of a lottery is a substantive rather than a procedural
determination.470 Moreover, the presence of sufficient considera-
(“[H]aving regard to [the Commonwealth Caribbean’s] colonial past, considerations of
sovereignty and independence (independence that is both legal and psychological) are
. . . central to the self-respect, self-confidence, and self-definition of Commonwealth
Caribbean people.”); see also SIR ROY MARSHALL, supra note 130, at 18 (“[T]he
benefits which the individual gets from judicial review are shared by society as a
whole . . . .”).
468. See LEACOCK, supra note 37.
469. See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 28 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ohio 1940)
(“[N]either the Constitution nor the statutes attempt to describe in detail the devices
or schemes that are prohibited. The Constitution prohibits ‘lotteries’ but gives no
definition of what a lottery is. The sections . . . make it an offense to dispose of a ticket
or device representing an interest in a lottery . . . or to promote such . . . or advertise a
lottery or scheme of chance or give publicity to such lottery or scheme of chance by
whatever name, style or title denominated or known.”).
470. For a definition of “lottery,” see supra note 9. See also, e.g., People v. Hecht, 3
P.2d 399 (Cal. 1931) (holding that where the winners of a lottery are determined, not
by chance, but at the will of the promoter, the enterprise is, nevertheless, a lottery);
People v. Wassmus, 182 N.W. 66 (Mich. 1921); Knight v. State ex rel. Moore, 574
So.2d 662 (Miss. 1990) (refusing to define the term “lottery” so broadly as to include
all transactions where chance, a prize, and a consideration exist, where to do so would
embrace numerous games which, while classifiable as gambling, are not popularly
thought of as lotteries; therefore, bingo was not a lottery, and a statute passed by the
legislature authorizing certain games of bingo did not unconstitutionally violate the
Mississippi constitutional provision banning lotteries); Harris v. Mo. Gaming
Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1994) (holding that lottery consists of “consideration,
chance and prize,” the court detailed the extent to which skill plays a part in various
games authorized by legislation challenged as coming within the constitutional
prohibition against lotteries, ruling that several games constitute lotteries, that poker
and blackjack or 21 do not, and remanding for factual determinations with respect to
the skill - if any - required for several other games; and, as to those games deemed to
be lotteries, ruling that legislature could not authorize their playing on riverboats in
violation of constitutional prohibition of lotteries); State v. Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109
(Mo. 1927); Contact, Inc. v. State, 324 N.W.2d 804 (Neb. 1982) (holding that certain
“pickle cards” constituted lotteries within meaning of state statute permitting certain
sponsors to hold lotteries, in that element of chance existed when winning tickets
were drawn from a tub, despite fact that winning numbers were predetermined);
Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (raffle was illegal lottery, hence charitable organization could not be
compelled to award prize); Cole v. Hughes, 442 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 1994) (the court, in
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tion, required for the formation of a valid contract, does not per se
nullify the conclusion that a wager was the legal outcome of a par-
ticular transaction.471 The determinative characteristics of a lot-
tery require that one party pays a definable sum in exchange for a
promise to transfer a greater sum or value than that actually paid,
triggered by an agreed contingency.472 Finally, although a lottery
is a function of a wager or bet, not every wager is necessarily a
lottery.473
A lottery requires three indispensable elements.474 First, there
must be a distribution of gain.475 Second, the prize must be
awarded by lot or chance.476 Third, the participants must have
provided consideration for a chance of winning the prize.477 In the
absence of all three elements, lottery law is inapplicable.478
affirming a decision dismissing a counterclaim based upon a joint venture to purchase
lottery tickets, stated: “The parties to the case at hand paid money and entered into
an agreement, the outcome of which was dependent upon the Virginia Lotto, a
contingent event, a chance, a lot, however ‘high tech.’”); Williams v. Weber Mesa
Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 1977) (raffle held to be lottery, illegal
and void).
471. See supra note 470, all of the sources cited therein.
472. Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978).
473. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 7 So. 338
(Ala. 1890); Grove Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 103 A. 14 (Me. 1918); Roselle v. McAuliffe, 39
S.W. 274 (Mo. 1897); Wilkinson v. Gill, 1878 WL 12627 (N.Y. 1878); Ex parte Kameta,
60 P. 394 (Or. 1900).
474. See FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 291 (1954) (“[T]here are three essential
elements of a ‘lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme’: (1) the distribution of prizes;
(2) according to chance; (3) for a consideration.”) (citations omitted); see also sources
cited supra note 9.
475. See sources cited supra note 9.
476. Id.; see also Stoddart v. Sagar, 2 QB 474, 18 Cox 165 (D.C.); People v. Reilly, 15
N.W. 520 (Mich. 1883); Harris v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1994)
(those games authorized by legislation that involved no skill, but only chance, such as
bingo, keno, and pull-tabs, fell within the definition of a lottery for purposes of the
Missouri constitutional prohibition against lotteries, while other games involving
skill, such as poker and blackjack or 21, did not, the court remanding to determine
whether skill played a party in several other games so as to insulate them from the
prohibition); Cole v. Hughes, 442 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 1994); Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch
Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 1977) (A lottery must depend upon a purely
fortuitous event).
477. FCC, 347 U.S. at 291.
478. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 887 P.2d 127 (Kan. 1994) (Kansas
constitutional provision banning lotteries, as amended to permit bingo, did not
authorize legislature to define bingo to include instant bingo pull-tab game, and
legislation enacted by Kansas legislature was therefore unconstitutional); Knight v.
State ex rel. Moore, 574 So.2d 662 (Miss. 1990) (the court refusing to define the term
“lottery” so broadly as to include all transactions where chance, a prize, and a
consideration exist, where to do so would embrace numerous games which, while
classifiable as gambling are not popularly thought of as lotteries; therefore, bingo was
not a lottery, and a statute passed by the legislature authorizing certain games of
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Indeed, even if elements of skill—in addition to chance—exist in
an event or game, the event or game nevertheless constitutes a
lottery if the elements of chance predominate.479 Furthermore, to
constitute a lottery, the prize need not be exclusively money.480
Instead, wherever the distribution mechanism is the payment of a
prize that is quantifiable in monetary terms, a lottery is proven,
even though the prize may be payable in forms of property other
than money, such as land or goods.481
For example, where a purchaser is required to pay a fixed
sum in return for a promise to convey a number of items—deter-
mined by the drawing of lots—an illegal lottery is proven.482 Also,
bingo did not unconstitutionally run afoul of Mississippi constitutional provision
banning lotteries); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58 (holding that lottery consists of
“consideration, chance and prize,” declaring unconstitutional so much of legislation as
purported to authorize certain gambling found to be lotteries within meaning of
Missouri constitution); Contact, Inc. v. State, 324 N.W.2d 804 (Neb. 1982) (holding
that certain “pickle cards” constituted lotteries within the meaning of state statute
permitting certain sponsors to hold lotteries, the court focusing principally on
whether the element of chance was met, holding that it was); McFadden v. Bain, 91
P.2d 292 (Or. 1939) (the essence of a lottery is a chance for a prize for a price);
Commonwealth v. Irwin, 636 A.2d 1106 (Pa. 1993) (video blackjack, poker, and other
games were not gambling machines per se where they lacked the element of reward;
gambling requires consideration, chance, and reward, and if machine has these three
elements it is intrinsically related to gambling; but where player could never win
more than he played, since tokens earned were carefully calculated by computer to
require more to be spent playing than the value of prizes which could be redeemed,
aspect of reward was absent).
479. Commonwealth v. Plissner, 4 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1936); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at
58.
480. The term “money” is used here to refer to the coin of the realm, or the legal
money of a particular country.
481. See People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1939); see also Nelson v.
Bryant, 220 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1975) (holding where appellant and respondent,
relatives by marriage, agreed independently that if respondent won an automobile at
a drawing held in conjunction with a fair, they would make a particular disposition of
it, it was unnecessary to determine whether the drawing constituted an illegal
lottery, since the transaction between the parties was separate from the drawing, and
did not depend upon any illegality); Williams, 572 P.2d at 412.
482. Willis v. Paul, 3 P.2d 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Glennville Inv. Co. v. Grace,
68 S.E. 301 (Ga. 1910); Lynch v. Rosenthal, 42 N.E. 1103 (Ind. 1896); Guenther v.
Dewien, 11 Iowa 133 (1860); Commonwealth v. Ward, 183 N.E. 271 (Mass. 1932)
(holding that a miniature shovel, purportedly to be used for the customer’s
amusement, which permits the one paying for the privilege of picking up and
retaining valuable objects, where the objects seldom are obtained, offends a statute
against lotteries); Glover v. Malloska, 213 N.W. 107 (Mich. 1927); State v. Powell, 212
N.W. 169 (Minn. 1927); State v. Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1927); Retail Section of
Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 257 N.W. 493 (Neb. 1934); Market
Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Spangenberger, 169 A. 660 (N.J. 1934); People v.
Miller, 2 N.E.2d 38 (N.Y. 1936); Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau
Cnty., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that raffle was an illegal
lottery and thus the sponsor could not be compelled to award prize); Allebach v.
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a raffle that entitled the plaintiff to buy (for a price of five dollars)
a chance to win a forty acre plot of land was ruled to be a void
gaming transaction.483 This transaction disabled plaintiff from
successful recovery when defendant drew plaintiff’s stub and then
subsequently, upon receiving late entries, conducted an entirely
new drawing that led to plaintiff’s loss of the designated prize.484
Moreover, the gift of a ticket for the drawing of prizes has
been held illegal where the ticket was a gift accompanying either
the purchase of goods,485 the purchase of an admission ticket,486 or
simply attending an auction.487 Actually, slot machine video or
computer games are generally held to violate anti-lottery statutes
or constitutional provisions where they do not involve a sufficient
element of skill, but instead are based solely or predominantly on
luck.488
In contrast, the receipt of “Lady Luck” coupons by custom-
ers—after eating their lunch-wagon meal—has been held to be
Godshalk, 9 A. 444 (Pa. 1887); Campbell v. Beaman, 68 Pa. Super. 30 (1917);
Featherstone v. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n of Tex., 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928); Blair v. Lowham, 276 P. 292 (Utah 1929); Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242 (Va.
1931); State v. Danz, 250 P. 37 (Wash. 1926).
483. Williams, 572 P.2d at 412.
484. Id.
485. See, e.g., Holmes v. Saunders, 250 P.2d 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Bloodworth v. Gay, 96 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1957); Glover, 213 N.W. at 107; Powell, 212
N.W. at 169; Emerson, 1 S.W.2d at 109; Kieck, 257 N.W. at 493; Spangenberger, 169
A. at 660; Miller, 2 N.E.2d at 38; Featherstone ,10 S.W.2d at 124.
486. See Blair, 276 P. at 292; Danz, 250 P. at 37.
487. Maughs, 161 S.E. at 242.
488. Loiseau v. State, 22 So. 138 (Ala. 1897); Lee v. City of Miami, 164 So. 486 (Fla.
1935); Thompson v. Ledbetter, 39 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); State v. Vill. of
Garden City, 265 P.2d 328 (Idaho 1953); State v. Brown, 244 P.2d 1190 (Kan. 1952);
State v. Barbee, 175 So. 50 (La. 1937); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 154 N.E. 264
(Mass. 1926); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58 (collecting cases declaring that slow machines
are lotteries, and ruling that record evidence was unclear respecting newer video
games as to whether they constituted pure games of chance, and were thus lotteries,
or games of skill, and hence not within the constitutional prohibition against
lotteries); MPH Co. v. Imagineering, Inc., 792 P.2d 1081 (Mont. 1990) (holding that
electronic poker/keno game was slot machine, not within various statutory exceptions
permitting certain machines, and contract between manufacturer and purchaser of
such machines, because it was for purchase of illegal machine, was void; thus, buyer
of such machines could have no recovery for breach of warranty); State ex rel.
Harrison v. Deniff, 245 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1952); State v. Marck, 220 P.2d 1017 (Mont.
1950); Ex parte Pierotti, 184 P. 209 (Nev. 1919); State v. Lowe, 101 S.E. 385 (N.C.
1919); Hendrix v. McKee, 575 P.2d 134 (Or. 1978) (holding that employment
agreement was unenforceable where employee was hired to make devices knowing
them to be illegal); State v. Coats, 74 P.2d 1120 (Or. 1938); Queen v. State, 246 S.W.
384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922); Callison v. State, 146 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940);
State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787 (Wash. 1952); State v. Hudson, 37
S.E.2d 553 (W. Va. 1946).
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legally different.489 The receipt of the “Lady Luck” coupons, enti-
tling the diners to draw for prizes, was subsequent to the meal.490
As a matter of law,  therefore, the participation by diners in the
drawing was entirely gratuitous.491  The absence of contractual
consideration disqualified the behavior from constituting a
lottery.492
Irrefutably, the courts are constitutionally obligated to deter-
mine what does and does not constitute a lottery.493 Therefore,
when courts interpret either constitutional or statutory defini-
tions of a lottery, the outcomes can be disparate and unpredict-
able. This is compounded by the fact that principles of statutory
interpretation apply both to the definitions themselves as well as
to any constitutional exceptions to the express prohibitions of
lotteries.
In recent times, a number of states have legalized state-run
lotteries,494 and declared such lotteries consonant with the particu-
lar state’s public policy in favor of generating funds for worthwhile
pursuits, such as educational programs,495 or other public pur-




493. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 779 (1948) (“[I]t is essential
that . . . the respective branches of the government keep within the powers assigned
to each by the Constitution.”); see also supra note 193.
494. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); N.Y. State
Broadcasters Ass’n v. U.S., 414 F.2d 990 (1969); Della Croce v. Ports, 550 A.2d 533
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (although New Jersey has legalized lotteries as well
as numerous other forms of gambling, activity falling outside the statutes’ scope, such
as an agreement to sell an interest in a lottery ticket at more than the ticket’s
purchase price, remains illegal); Hughes v. Cole, 465 S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1996) (holding
that the legality of the state lottery itself did not legalize an arrangement to split the
winnings).
495. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8880.1 (West 2013) (education); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 4815 (West 2013) (Division of Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Mental Health of
the Department of Health and Social Services for funding programs for the treatment,
education, and assistance of compulsive gamblers and their families); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 24.102 (West 2013) (improvements in public education, proceeds are not to be used
as a substitute for existing resources for public education); GA. CODE ANN. (West
2013) § 50-27-32 (educational programs and purposes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-905
(West 2013) (education); IOWA CODE ANN. § 99E.10 (repealed 2003) (gamblers
assistance program, and funds directed to Clan Fund for benefit of Iowa’s
environment); MO. CONST. art. III, § 39(b) (education); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-812
(West 2012) (amended 2013) (education, gambling assistance, and environment); N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 6-b (education); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:9-2 (West 2013) (education);
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1601 (Consol. 2013) (education); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6 (education);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461.540 (West 2013) (creating jobs, furthering the economic
development of Oregon, and financing public education); W.VA. CODE § 29-22-18
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poses.496  Nevertheless, such provisions are strictly construed by
the judiciary; and, lotteries, or factors related to them, that fall
outside the express legalizing parameters of the statutes497 remain
illegal.498
In substance, the judiciary has made it clear that the elimina-
tion of opprobrium with respect to one aspect of gambling—includ-
ing lotteries—is not an automatic legalization of all factors
applicable to the particular type of gambling.499 Indeed, although a
lottery may have been made legal in Virginia, other aspects of
gambling, including those relating to lotteries, are not automati-
(West 2013) (school building debts, state ten year bonds, education); Brown v. Cal.
State Lottery Comm’n, 284 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1991) (In an action against the California
State Lottery Commission and a store whose malfunctioning terminal would not
allow plaintiff to pick his own lottery numbers, plaintiff had no cause of action as a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between the commission and the store, since
the purpose of the California State Lottery Act of 1984, §§ 8880.1–.14, was to benefit
the state’s public education system, not those who wished to engage in a capricious
fling with fortune; plaintiff was not a creditor beneficiary, since the state did not
contract with the store to discharge any legal duty that it owed to him; nor was he a
done beneficiary, since the state neither intended to bestow a gift ton him nor did it
seek to assign an enforceable right against the store).
496. See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 5 (“[M]ore common is the
“earmarking” of lottery money for identified programs.”).
497. Extrapolation is severely circumscribed, if not entirely excluded by the
judiciary altogether. See Kennedy v. Annandale Boys Club, Inc., 272 S.E.2d 38, 39
(Va. 1980) (“[The legislature] did not see fit to make available the state’s legal
machinery necessary to enforce gaming contracts. On the contrary, it expressly
withheld the right to enforce a gaming contract by a civil action.”) (citation omitted).
498. See, e.g., Miller v. Radikopf, 228 N.W.2d 386 (1975); Harris v. Econ.
Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(holding that raffle, sponsored by charitable organization, was illegal lottery, and
sponsor could not be compelled to award prize; rather, plaintiff was limited to
statutory recovery of twice his wager, or twenty dollars); Keene Convenient Mart, Inc.
v. SSS Band Backers, 427 S.E.2d 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding invalid a raffle
where, during drawing, an error caused the randomness of the raffle to be
compromised, because  once the randomness was compromised, the raffle was no
longer a valid activity, and hence fell within the general prohibition against
gambling); see also Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 820.
499. See Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 828 (discussing Kennedy, 272 S.E.2d at 38, and
observing that “[b]y statute, the [legislature] removed the taint of illegality from the
operation of a bingo game by certain organizations and under certain conditions, and
the taint of illegality from participating in and playing bingo, and in giving and
receiving prizes and consideration incident thereto . . . . While [the legislature’s]
action may be construed as legalizing bingo . . . it nevertheless did not render valid
and enforceable the contract between the operators of the game and those who play.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted);  see also Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating
Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (1993) (holding illegal the plaintiffs’ purchase of shares in a
ticket, even though the bettor lawfully obtained the ticket, because when the
underlying bet that gave rise to the ticket was later cancelled, the purchase of the
shares in the ticket was considered outside the scope of statutorily authorized pari-
mutual betting).
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cally legalized, unless the specific language of the statute so pro-
vides.500 Moreover, the legal validity of lotteries in one state does
not transfer legal validity to the sale of lottery tickets in a jurisdic-
tion that forbids such sales, because this would be an outright vio-
lation of state sovereignty.501
However, with regard to the identification of a federal public
policy embedded in the case law, caution is the watchword.502 At
the federal level, the judiciary treats lottery and non-lottery states
evenhandedly and scrupulously respects the public policy of each
individual state to ban or empower lotteries as the individual
state sees fit.503 Therefore, even federal statutes and their imple-
menting regulations are strictly construed.504 Under this
approach, such bans must simultaneously respect non-lottery
states’ power to prohibit lotteries505 and lottery states’ power to
legalize lotteries.506 This even-handedness must also acknowledge
that both lottery and non-lottery states’ power ends at each partic-
ular state’s borders. As a result, federal anti-lottery statutes that
ban lottery advertising work to conserve and reinforce state public
policy banning lotteries,507 while respecting a state’s power to
legalize lotteries within its own borders.508 Such judicial even-
handedness ensures a narrow application of any federal legisla-
500. Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 827 (“[The Virginia statutory language voids] any
contract where the whole or any part of the consideration is money won at any game
. . . .”).
501. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §60 (2013).
502. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
503. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
504. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West
2013), recognized as unconstitutional by Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt
(10th Cir. 2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1307 (West 2013) (exempts state lotteries).
505. See Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 421 (“Congress has, since the early 19th
century, sought to assist the States in controlling lotteries.”) (emphasis added).
506. Id. (“[L]otteries have existed in this country since its founding.”).
507. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); See also FCC v. ABC,  347 U.S. 284,
291 (1954).
508. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West
2013), recognized as unconstitutional by Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt
(10th Cir. 2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1307 (West 2013) (exempts state lotteries).
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tion banning lottery-related advertising.509
Today, lotteries retain the legal status of a gambling bar-
gain.510 Thus, even though legal in the majority of states in the
U.S, a lottery remains illegal unless specifically authorized by leg-
islation.511 This requirement endures because of the perception
that gambling exacerbates an unrealistic tendency that, suppos-
edly, too many poor people seem to display.512 It is also supported
by a potent criticism.513 Furthermore, since the prospect of gain is
so remote, the risk of losing the money spent on lotteries is not
counterbalanced by a sufficient prospect of a substantial benefit.
Gambling has been banned historically because it tends to impose
unacceptably high risks of serious financial injury upon certain
vulnerable classes of the community.514 Certainly, the NGISC did
not detect evidence supporting the existence of specific counterbal-
ancing community benefits derived from lotteries.515
However, “[t]here is much anecdotal evidence to support the
notion that gambling . . . provides economic benefits for the com-
509. Id.
510. See Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 415 (Wyo.
1977) (“[It is] the duty of the trial court to determine the character of a contract, even
though its illegality or its validity, as being in violation of law, was not raised by the
pleading in the absence of a statute requiring such a defense to be pleaded.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
511. Id.
512. Supposedly, too many poor people seem to be willing to venture their money in
the face of a significantly high probability that they will lose it. Cf. Jack Ludwig,
Charge That Gambling Industry Preys on the Poor Not Borne Out in Gallup Survey,
High-income and high-education Americans play heavily, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (July 8,
1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/3733/charge-gambling-industry-preys-poor-borne-
gallup-survey.aspx.
513. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 9 (“The image of the state promoting a
highly regressive scheme among its poorest citizens by playing on their unrealistic
hopes is a highly evocative one.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, the NAACP chapter in
Dallas has claimed that “the [lottery] drains the finances of low-income ticket-buyers
who can least afford it, especially minorities” and the chapter has conducted an
ongoing lobbying campaign in an attempt to persuade the Texas legislature to
eliminate the Texas lottery. See Dugald McConnell & Brian Todd, Dallas NAACP
seeks end to Texas lottery, CNN (June 30, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
06/29/us/texas-naacp-lottery/index.html.
514. See Harris v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1994) (holding that
legislature cannot constitutionally permit certain forms of legalized gambling because
it constituted lottery in violation of state constitution); People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d
796 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1939); Williams, 572 P.2d at 412 (holding that wagers are
against human welfare).
515. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 17 (“[I]t appears that the public’s
approval of lotteries rests more on the idea of lotteries reducing the potential tax
burden on the general public than it is on any specific instance of relief.”).
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munities that allow it.”516 This anecdotal evidence has apparently
not been confirmed by scientifically evaluated data.517 Certainly,
the modern trend towards more and more extensive state-creation
of lotteries has not changed the general societal reprobation
towards lotteries.518 This is exemplified by the fact that, in recent
years, lotteries have been resoundingly prohibited in many states
as a form of gambling.519 Because of this societal norm of reproba-
tion in the U.S., courts treat laws that legalize lotteries as excep-
tions to the general policy against gambling. As a result, such
lottery-enabling laws will continue to be very strictly construed.520
The unabated strength of the state public policy against gambling
demands that statutes and regulations that impact legalized gam-
bling be strictly and narrowly construed.521 The judiciary’s goal is
to limit the powers and rights claimed under such legislative
authority to the narrowest possible legislative boundaries.
In this regard, statutorily authorized gaming entities are the
intended beneficiaries of statutes requiring the fair and equitable
dissemination of gambling information to the public.522 Statutes
legalizing gambling have the purpose of authorizing, licensing,
and controlling gaming activities in order to stimulate and pro-
mote the growth of the particular state’s economy.523 The legisla-
tive intent is ultimately to foster and assure that honest wagering
takes place,524 and to create and maintain the public’s confidence
in perceiving that such is the case.525 The overall intention is to
516. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 87 (emphasis added); see also Jonah Lehrer,
Cracking the Scratch Lottery Code, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://
www.wired.com/magazine/2011/01/ff_lottery/all/1 (“Since 1964, when New Hampshire
introduced the first modern state lottery, governments have come to rely on gaming
revenue . . . .  In some states, the lottery accounts for more than 5 percent of education
funding.”).
517. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 88.
518. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (“While lotteries
have existed in this country since its founding, States have long viewed them as a
hazard to their citizens and to the public interest . . . .”) (emphasis added).
519. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §§ 5, 10 (2013).
520. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §§ 17, 18 (2013).
521. See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 287 (N.M. 1995) (“[W]hen
considering whether the legislature has authorized use of Power Bingo devices, we
must, in light of New Mexico’s strong public policy against gambling, construe the
terms of the Act narrowly.”); see also Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted) (“Public policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus,
the regulations pertaining thereto are to be strictly construed.”).
522. Sports Form, Inc. v. Leroy’s Horse and Sports Place, 823 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1992).
523. St. Charles Gaming Co. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 648 So. 2d 1310 (La.
1995).
524. Id.
525. Moya v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm’n, 870 P.2d 620 (Colo. App. 1994).
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strictly regulate all parties involved in gaming operations in order
to preserve the integrity and credibility of these operations where
states have made them legal to pursue.526
IX. FEDERAL LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LOTTERIES
The U.S. Constitution includes neither express nor implied
provisions relating to lotteries or lottery law. Furthermore,
because lottery laws implicate moral fundamentals, it is generally
a function of state law.527 Of course, where constitutional dimen-
sions such as freedom of speech are implicated, substantive, ortho-
dox constitutional law applies.528 This means that, for example,
federal legislative enactments applicable to lottery advertising
cannot infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights such as
the right to free speech under the U.S. Constitution.529 Therefore,
although lottery advertising regulation falls squarely under fed-
eral communications law,  constitutional free speech rights cannot
be unlawfully infringed upon by such measures.530
In this federal law context, the federal judiciary is not legally
empowered to favor or disfavor the public policy of any one state
over that of any other state.531 The public policy of each state is
equally viable under the U.S. Constitution and the federal judici-
ary must be disinterested and neutral in its evaluation of the legal
impact of lottery advertising upon the right to free speech under
the U.S. Constitution.532
X. THE LEGAL IMPACT OF TAX-SUBSTITUTION GOALS ON
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN STATE LOTTERY LAWS
AND PUBLIC POLICY
The tax-substitution fiscal objectives, which may motivate
changes in state-lottery laws, do not necessarily dissolve the pub-
526. Mastro v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 667 N.E.2d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
527. See Rosemary, 500 S.E.2d at 179 (“The government is imbued with the power
to legislate for the protection of the public health, welfare and morals.”). Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (“[The police power] extends to all matters
affecting the public health or the public morals.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).




532. See id. at 434 (“[Congress can enact statutes that] accommodate non-lottery
States’ interest in discouraging public participation in lotteries, even as they
accommodate the countervailing interests of lottery States . . . [w]ithin the bounds of
the general protection provided by the Constitution to commercial speech . . . .”).
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lic-policy reprobation of lotteries at all.533 Therefore, the argument
can be made that public policy regarding lotteries has not been
fundamentally changed by recent legislative changes in state lot-
tery law.534 In fact, the precision of each state’s legislation in turn
circumscribes the legal reach of each statutory enactment.535 For
example, principles of state sovereignty dictate that state legisla-
tures may enact measures governing the operation of lotteries
only within the particular state.536 This is used to create a state
monopoly in each one of the individual states that have legalized
and regulated lotteries.537 Restrictions or empowerment are
legally valid and tenable in the operation of lotteries in the partic-
ular state alone.538
First, the fundamental and unanimous individual state moti-
vation for the legalization of lotteries has been the substitution of
a voluntary tax to take the place of involuntary taxation.539  “Vot-
ers want states to spend more, and politicians look at lotteries as a
way to get tax money for free.”540 Modern political pressures—
caused mainly by government financial needs in order to finance
its policy goals—have created almost intolerable economic
stress.541 Politicians inevitably navigate a passage similar to the
mythical passage between Scylla and Charybdis.542  It consists of
533. See Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Public
policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto are to




536. See sources cited supra note 48.
537. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 3 (“[F]or the most
part [states adhere] to single model for the lottery’s operation and financing.  In each
state the government has . . . made itself the sole provider, and used the profits from
the operation as a new source of revenue.”).
538. See sources cited supra note 48.
539. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2 (“The principal argument in every
state to promote the adoption of a lottery has focused on its value as a source of
“painless” revenue: players voluntarily spending their money (as opposed to the
general public being taxed) for the benefit of the public good.”) (emphasis added); see
also GOLDWATER, supra note 7, at 49 (“The size of the government’s rightful claim—
that is, the total amount it may take in taxes—will be determined by how we define
the ‘legitimate functions of government.’”).
540. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 2 (citation omitted).
541. Id.
542. See HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 222 (“[In mythology this was a
perilous sea passage between] the whirlpool of implacable Charybdis and the black
cavern into which Scylla sucked whole ships.”). This is also referred to as being
“between a rock and a hard place,” or in Barbados in the Caribbean, where it is
referred to as being “between the devil and the deep blue sea.”
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political pressures on states to either increase taxation in order to
maintain public programs at current levels of funding, or cut
them.543 Quite predictably, politicians tend to select the alterna-
tive of the “free” mechanism,544 rather than take the political risks
of losing their office that accompany raising taxes.
Moreover, the NGISC’s Report on Lotteries refers to an argu-
ment by lottery promoters that “because illegal gambling already
exists, a state-run lottery is an effective device both for capturing
money for public purposes that otherwise would disappear into
criminal hands and also for suppressing illegal gambling.”545 In
this sense, legislative enactments legalizing state-run lotteries
represent a legislative policy to opt for the lesser of two evils.546
This may make the embracement of lotteries by the forty or so
states that have adopted them a less reprehensible administra-
tive-law policy than it might have appeared to be at first blush.547
Making lotteries a part of the state’s administrative-agency struc-
ture rescues this form of gambling from the grasp of local and
national criminal elements, and transforms it safely and legally
into a segment of the state’s executive branch of government.548
However, state lottery authorities, as administrative agencies of
the state that created them, are certainly subject to pertinent pro-
visions of the United States Constitution.549
The scope of the embrace of lotteries by states550 implicates
issues pertaining to substantive common law public policy.
543. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 8, at 5.
544. Id. at 2.
545. Id. at 3.
546. Id. (“New York’s lottery, for example, reports that as a result [of the New York
state-run lottery], illegal numbers activities have been eliminated for the most part in
most areas of the State with the exception of New York City.”) (citations omitted).
547. See CLOTFELTER, COOK, EDELL & MOORE, supra note 62, at 19 (“Owing to its
structure and management orientation, the typical state lottery authority has evolved
into a new breed of governmental agency. Virtually all state lotteries conform to a
single basic model. . . . ”) (emphasis added).
548. These state administrative agencies do not expressly function under the
authority of the Government of the United States and are therefore not expressly
subject to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (West 2011)
(defining “agency” to mean each authority of the Government of the United States).
However, similar administrative law principles are applied to them. See WALTER
GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CASES AND COMMENTS 11 (2011)
(“Administrative law comprises the body of general rules and principles governing
administrative agencies . . . .  It exists at all levels of government – federal, state and
local. . . .”) (emphasis added).
549. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
550. See CLOTHFELTER, COOK, EDELL & MOORE, supra note 62, at 1 (“[Lotteries] are
also a worldwide phenomenon: there are 100 countries where lotteries are legal.”).
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Whether, for example, a state’s embrace of the lesser of two evils
transform the evil embraced into a non-evil.551 Another question is
whether  “lotteries [are] a more or less harmless form of recrea-
tion[?]”552 Yet another would be whether “lottery play is a benign
activity[?]”553 Or, whether legislative legalization of lotteries jus-
tify “taxing lottery products [no] more heavily than liquor or
tobacco. . . .”554 The judiciary’s answer seems to be that these ques-
tions are beside the point with respect to the analytical applica-
tion of public policy to cases implicating lotteries.555
Thus, the judiciary has concluded that the lesser of two evils
does not at all denote a substantive transformation.556 But the
lesser of two evils remains an evil nonetheless.557 Its status of
being lesser than a greater evil does not per se transform its fun-
damentally evil legal status.558 Inevitably, therefore, the present-
day, widespread creation of lottery-operation monopolies by legis-
latures in a majority of states in the U.S. has not necessarily
transformed public policy in any universally substantive way.559
Instead, the present day creation of lotteries by states coexists
side-by-side with the prior, fundamental, judicially-enunciated
public policy applicable to gambling.560 The widespread embrace of
lotteries by state legislatures has not wholly transformed public
policy in the judiciary’s evaluation.561 Rather, the prior public pol-
icy disfavoring gambling in general and lotteries in particular
551. Id. at 19 (“The lottery is in a sense the state governments’ biggest business
venture, and a rather problematic one given widespread ethical and pragmatic
concerns about gambling.”) (emphasis added).
552. Id. at 21.
553. Id. at 22.
554. Id.
555. See Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Gambling in
this State in general is prohibited . . . . The Lottery is authorized because it is
operated with the specific purpose of raising funds for education . . . . [Nevertheless]
[p]ublic policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining





560. See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 287 (N.M. 1995) (“[W]e
presume that the legislature was aware of existing statutory and common law and
did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law . . . . [W]hen considering
whether the legislature has authorized use of Power Bingo devices, we must, in light
of New Mexico’s strong public policy against gambling, construe the terms of the Act
narrowly.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
561. See id. (explaining that each legislative enactment must be strictly construed
by the judiciary within the common law’s analytical framework of public policy).
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remains intact.562 It is an American legal phenomenon that the
Commonwealth Caribbean is highly likely to emulate in each
deserving case.563
XI. TAX FACTORS IN THE CURRENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC
POLICY LANDSCAPE
Condemnation of gambling generally, and of lotteries in par-
ticular, has arguably remained the dominant fundamental of pub-
lic policy in the modern era.564 Indeed, the opinion of one
commentator is that perhaps the NGISC565 may have over empha-
sized state economic needs.566 Counterbalancing arguments relat-
ing to the regressive nature of lotteries may not have been
presented with sufficient tenacity.567 Moreover, the potentially
unfair use of lotteries as tax-substitutes may have been under-
emphasized.568 The commentator expressed a number of
laments.569 Nevertheless, the commentator did acknowledge that
“the Commission asserted that individual states best knew how to
regulate themselves . . . .”570
This is probably inevitable in light of the Tenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.571  Thus, the regulation of lotteries
remains vested in the Several States,572 although, some other
562. Id.
563. See sources cited supra note 37.
564. See sources cited supra note 69; see also NIBERT, supra note 107, at 114
(“[T]raditional religious condemnation of gambling and lotteries ostensibly was
supported by a conservative, Republican-controlled Congress, which, in 1996, created
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission . . . to examine the social
implications of gambling.”).
565. See supra note 8.
566. See NIBERT, supra note 107, at 115 (“The Commission submitted a number of
recommendations to the President and Congress for consideration but . . . economic
exigencies largely eclipsed moral appeals for fairness and justice.”).
567. Id. (“Notably, criticism . . . especially about the regressive nature of lotteries,
did not figure prominently in the debates in the . . .U.S.”).
568. Id. (“In the future, it will be particularly important . . . to articulate [the
regressive nature of lotteries] if true consideration of the public interest is to be
brought into discussions about the future of state lotteries, [and] the entire system of
unfair taxation . . . .”).
569. Id. (“[T]he [Commission’s] report made no mention of the tumultuous economic
and political events of the last quarter century that prompted the emergence of
lotteries and other forms of gambling as forms of revenue creation and economic
development . . . . [T]he Commission muted its critique by lauding the wonders of
gambling as a form of economic development . . . .”).
570. Id. (emphasis added).
571. See sources cited supra note 378 and accompanying discussion.
572. Id.
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forms of gambling may be somewhat different.573 Congress has
acknowledged the constitutional power of the Tenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution in enacting the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act of 1988 (IGRA) “which recognizes tribal sovereignty while
giving states a significant role in setting the parameters of gam-
ing within their borders.”574 This therefore makes competition with
state lotteries575 from Indian gaming an unlikely prospect.576
[i] Future Prospects
The Commission seems to anticipate that the public policy
tension577 in the state law of each of the individual states—that
legalized lotteries—will remain unchanged.578 This public policy
tension is inevitable because of continuing lottery-legalization by
state legislatures on the one hand and the judiciary’s continuing
reprobation of gambling generally and lotteries in particular.579
This means that the well-established common law principles cate-
gorizing lottery contracts as illegal agreements will remain intact
and such agreements will also remain legally null and void.580
This also means that each court will continue to leave par-
ties—that are equal participants in the illegality—where it finds
them.581 A number of states still have constitutional or statutory
provisions prohibiting the promotion or conduct of lotteries or the
sale of lottery tickets.582  In some states, such prohibitions are then
573. E.g., Orthodox taxation of Indian gaming would probably swell state tax
coffers significantly in addition to lottery-derived revenues, however, with respect to
the regulation of Indian gaming. See Kathryn  R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle:
How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence over
Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971 (2007) (“A basic tenet of federal Indian law is
that, as sovereign nations, tribes ordinarily are not subject to the strictures of state
law.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
574. Id. (“Under IGRA, tribes may conduct gaming only in those states that
“permit[ ] such gaming for any purpose by any person.”  As a result, state law in the
first place dictates the permissible scope of Indian gaming.”) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
575. Without state input.
576. Id.
577. See supra notes 84–91, and accompanying discussions.
578. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 3–1.
579. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 9, at 11 (“There
exists, in short, an undeniable Jekyll-and-Hyde quality to state lotteries.  It arises
from our ambivalence toward gambling itself.  On the one side is the traditional view
of gambling as a vice and the opprobrium directed toward those who overindulge.  On
the other is the wide acceptance of gambling in moderation as an innocent form of
amusement.”).
580. See sources cited supra note 83.
581. See sources cited supra note 73; see also 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 216 (2013).
582. See, e.g., Cole v. Hughes, 442 S.E.2d 86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL108.txt unknown Seq: 70 12-FEB-14 9:48
160 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
subjected to enacted exceptions empowering state monopolies to
conduct these otherwise prohibited operations.583 States that have
authorized lotteries have done so for specifically identified pur-
poses, such as charitable, educational, or religious purposes.584
Now, the widespread legalization of lotteries throughout the U.S.
has created other tensions between lottery states, where lotteries
are lawful and non-lottery states where lotteries remain
prohibited.585
One example of these other tensions is a recent practice that
has developed when large prizes are offered by lottery-jackpots in
various lottery-states.586 This practice may consist of agreements
between friends, relatives, or co-workers to pool resources and
purchase lottery tickets subject to terms that winnings will be dis-
tributed among them.587 The validity and legality of such agree-
ments have been subjected to legal challenge and courts that have
decided such cases have reached differing conclusions.588
One group of courts has refused to enforce such agreements—
if made in a non-lottery state—on the ground that such agree-
ments violate the public policy of the state where the parties to
the joint venture reside.589 The fact that playing the lottery in
583. The existence and legality of the dichotomy of lottery and non-lottery states is
acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting and applying federal
statutory enactments in light of fundamental rights mandated by the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993)
(“Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to
support the anti-gambling policy of a State like North Carolina by forbidding stations
in such a State from airing lottery advertising. At the same time it sought not to
unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery sponsoring State such as Virginia.”)
(emphasis added).
584. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §§ 57–60 (2013).
585. See, e.g., Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. at 433-34 (upholding against
constitutional attack the federal anti-lottery statute which prohibits broadcasting of
lottery advertising by licensee licenses in state which does not allow lotteries even
though licensee licenses in state which does allow lotteries may so broadcast); FCC v.
ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
586. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“News
accounts and personal observations reveal that it is common practice for friends,
relatives, and coworkers to pool their resources and purchase large blocks of tickets
on those occasions when various state lotteries present exceptionally large prizes.”);
see also Cole, 442 S.E.2d at 86; Talley v. Mathis, 453 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 1995). These
agreements to jointly participate in particular lotteries and share the winnings may
be informal and oral.
587. Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 113, 118.
588. Id.
589. See Hughes v. Cole, 465 S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1996) (holding void—since it was
violative of North Carolina anti-gaming laws—joint venture agreement entered into
in North Carolina by North Carolina residents in spite of the legality of gambling on
the lottery in Virginia).
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issue is lawful in the state where the purchase was made has not
necessarily saved the agreement from legal nullification.590
[ii] Courts that Refuse Enforcement
For example, in Cole v. Hughes,591 the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina declined to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the
lottery ticket in issue.592 This made sense because common law
courts will not reach decisions that the court itself is legally inca-
pable of enforcing.593 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of North Car-
olina ruled that it was legally precluded from enforcing any in rem
adjudication over legal or equitable title to the lottery ticket
because the ticket was located outside the jurisdiction of the
North Carolina courts in Virginia.594 Unavoidably, therefore, a
decision by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina declaring own-
ership of the ticket would be nullified if the Virginia courts dis-
agreed with the North Carolina court’s decision.595
The counterclaim by the defendants sought adjudication of
“the rights of the parties under the alleged joint venture agree-
ment.”596 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina clearly had juris-
diction over this issue for the following reasons. First, at the time
of the litigation “all parties to the agreement [were] North Caro-
lina residents, and they entered into the venture in North Caro-
lina.”597 The Court therefore applied North Carolina public policy
to the joint venture at issue and declared it “illegal.”598
This determination invoked North Carolina’s anti-gambling
and anti-lottery public policies.599 The Court made it clear in no
uncertain terms that “North Carolina public policy is against gam-
bling and lotteries.”600 Inevitably, therefore, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina affirmed the trial court’s dismiss of the defend-
ants’ counterclaim “because it sought to enforce a contract or joint
590. Id.
591. 442 S.E.2d at 86.
592. Id. at 89 (“It is indisputable that [the lottery ticket in issue] had been
presented to the lottery authorities in Virginia, and that it is there now.”).
593. Id. (“We do not have the jurisdiction to assert, or the power to enforce . . . a
decision [of the North Carolina courts] in Virginia.”).
594. Id. at 88 (“In rem jurisdiction may not be invoked over property located outside
this state.”) (citations omitted).
595. Id.




600. Id. (citations omitted).
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venture which is illegal and against the public policy of North
Carolina.”601
After staying its resolution until final adjudication in North
Carolina was complete,602 the Virginia courts dealt with the agree-
ment in controversy that was made in North Carolina and nulli-
fied it.603 In final resolution of the case, the Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed both the primary decision of the Virginia trial
court,604 as well as the trial court’s alternative ground for nullify-
ing the agreement made in North Carolina.605
[iii] Courts that Permit Enforcement in Judicially
Tolerable Circumstances
The shroud of uncertainty as to whether courts will enforce
agreements relating to ‘pooling” funds to buy lottery tickets and
share in the winnings, if any, makes such agreements perilous.
Court-refusal on public policy grounds to enforce such agreements
in spite of the fact that such lottery tickets are purchased in the
context of a state-promoted lottery is problematic.  In fact, the
courts in some states have permitted enforcement of similar
agreements between comparable parties, reasoning that the par-
ties to such agreements are really not engaged in gambling
between or among each other.606 Because it is lawful to purchase
601. Cole, 442 S.E.2d at 89.
602. Hughes v. Cole, 465 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Va. 1996) (“In the meantime, the
[Virginia] trial court had stayed proceedings in the Virginia case pending the outcome
of the North Carolina litigation.”).
603. Id.
604. Id. at 835 (discussing Virginia trial court’s ruling that  “under Virginia’s choice
of law doctrine, the law of the place of making governs the determination of a
contract’s validity, [and] that “the law of North Carolina shall govern the validity of
the agreement and the obligation between the parties . . . .” and holding that, because,
the “North Carolina courts having decided that the agreement is illegal and against
the public policy of North Carolina [it] is accordingly void and unenforceable in [North
Carolina and] there exists no agreement which may be enforced in Virginia”).
605. Id. (“Alternatively, the trial court ruled that if North Carolina law did not
apply, the agreement was void and unenforceable under Virginia law.”) This was the
case because any modification of Virginia gambling law by the Virginia legislature
was precisely circumscribed in the modifying legislation and did not include the
legalization of agreements such as the one entered into by the pertinent parties
embroiled in the case before the Virginia courts.
606. See Talley v. Mathis, 453 D.E.2d 704, 704 (Ga. 1995); see also Kaszuba v.
Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1987) (upholding as lawful an agreement between two
Indiana residents that one would travel to Illinois and, using money given him by the
other, would purchase lottery tickets for the latter; although participating in a lottery
in Indiana would be unlawful under both statutory and constitutional provisions, the
majority of the court found nothing unlawful or violative of public policy in one person
agreeing to purchase tickets for another in Illinois, where lottery was legal; the case is
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lottery tickets in the state where the lottery tickets are sold, the
courts in some states have concluded that no public policy of the
state in which the joint venturers reside is substantively vio-
lated.607 Instead, such courts have been persuaded that the parties
are merely agreeing to participate jointly in a specific enterprise
that is legal in the state where performance is to be consummated
under the agreement.608
obviously different; refusal to sanction such an agreement would, as the court put it,
“reward people who convert the property of others to their own use,” since the
defendant had merely agreed to use the plaintiff’s money to purchase a lawful item for
the plaintiff, and then refused to give the item to him); Miller v. Radikopf, 228 N.W.2d
386 (Mich. 1975) (where plaintiff alleged that he and defendant had agreed to sell
Irish Sweepstakes tickets in Michigan, which was illegal, and for which they were
given two free tickets for every twenty they sold, with the understanding that they
would share the prize if one of the free tickets won; when it did, defendant refused to
split the prize and plaintiff sued; the court enforced the agreement, stating the issue
to be whether public policy would be offended by enforcing an agreement to share
money legally paid to the holder of a ticket legally possessed; the court noted that
while it was illegal for the parties to sell sweepstakes tickets, it was not illegal under
Irish law to pay the proceeds to the holders of tickets or illegal under Michigan law to
be paid the proceeds voluntarily, though no action to compel payment could be
brought; that being so, an agreement to share amounts so paid would not violate
public policy either; this, of course, ignores the fact that the manner of the ticket’s
acquisition depend on illegality though the court pointed out that it need not have
done so; the court also noted that to hold otherwise would reward “promissory
default;” it buttressed its view on the position of some courts permitting enforcement,
though gambling is illegal where the action is brought, of a gambling debt incurred
where gambling is legal; the analogy is at best imperfect, since the “debt” involved in
the instant case was incurred in Michigan where gambling was illegal; it is worth
noting too that Michigan, as pointed out by the dissenting opinion, sponsors a state
run lottery, suggesting that the public policy against lotteries may not be as strong as
in such jurisdiction as North Carolina where lotteries remain prohibited); Pineiro v.
Nieves, 259 A.2d 920 (N.J. App. Div. 1969) (by statute, permitting New Jersey
residents to possess lottery tickets lawfully bought in lottery states, noting also that
New Jersey had recently adopted lottery legislation, and holding that public policy
was not offended by agreement to share proceeds of lottery ticket); Castilleja v.
Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967) (Texas residents, allegedly agreed that one
would go to Mexico and purchase Mexican lottery tickets, and that they would split
the winnings, which were to be collected in Mexico; the court ruled that the contract
was a Mexican contract, valid there, and that no Texas public policy was violated;
distinguishing an earlier decision where the parties had illegally purchased a
Honduran lottery ticket in Texas; the money in the instant case was located in a
Mexican bank, having been paid in Mexico to the defendant, and the court viewed the
transaction as simply one to enforce a right that arose extra-territorially; the dissent
argued that the agreement being enforced was not a Mexico agreement at all, but a
Texas bargain performable wholly in Texas, to split the proceeds of a lottery, and
therefore unenforceable in Texas).
607. See, e.g., Castilleja, 414 S.W.2d at 426 (focusing on legality in the state of
performance of the agreement rather than focusing exclusively on the state where the
agreement may have been made).
608. See id.
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Motivating theses courts is the concern that permitting hold-
ers of winning tickets to renege on their agreements in such
instances should not be overlooked or ignored because it is unscru-
pulous conduct.609 Arguably, unscrupulous conduct is immoral and
merits attention and evaluation by the judiciary.610 In these cir-
cumstances, allowing unscrupulous actors to escape enforcement
of an agreement into which all parties freely entered is itself a
public policy concern.611 The question thus becomes whether the
failure to enforce these agreements confers any public policy bene-
fit on the non-enforcing state.612
Depending upon the facts and circumstances presented to
courts, these agreements may be characterized as a joint ven-
ture613 to participate in and divide the profits from lottery ticket




612. See Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 116–17 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
613. The term “joint venture” is used here to refer to an informal partnership
agreement.
614. See Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 117 (affirming lower court’s holding that oral
agreement existed between two friends to share equally in the proceeds from a
winning District of Columbia lottery ticket based on their conduct on the evening that
the ticket was purchased); see also Fitchie v. Yurko, 570 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (affirming lower court’s finding of an informal partnership agreement between
the claimants and the ticket holder to entitle them to an equal share in the winnings);
Pando v. Fernandez, 499 N.Y.S. 2d 950 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (reversing lower court’s
grant of summary judgment for the recipient of the proceeds from a winning state-
operated lottery ticket on the ground of the impossibility of the proof of a condition
precedent, saintly intervention, where one version of the terms of an oral partnership
agreement advanced by the minor could be proven in a court of law); Yates v. Tisdale,
3 Edw. Ch. 71 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) (holding that there was sufficient evidence presented of
a clear, positive, and unconditional agreement to sell a share of the lottery ticket, and
that the purchaser was entitled to the same share of the prize); Hamilton v. Long, 588
N.E.2d 942, 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (affirming lower court’s finding of an enforceable
oral contract between the recipient of the value of an automobile won during her
appearance on a “Cash Explosion” television show and two employees who had
purchased the “entry” lottery ticket which entitled the holder to appear on the show);
King v. Thomas, 566 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 1991) (affirming without opinion lower court’s
conclusion that the parties had agreed to jointly purchase and share equally in the
proceeds from both Super Lotto and kicker lottery tickets); Johnson v. Spence, 730
N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that live-in girlfriend stated cause of
action for breach of oral argument by alleging that she and her partner had agreed to
purchase lottery tickets jointly and to share proceeds of any winning lottery ticket);
Johnson v. Johnson, 594 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that signed and
witnessed agreement clearly established intent of parties to share joint ownership of
proceeds from winning lottery ticket and agreement was supported by consideration,
that is, forbearance and mutual promises made by parties to surrender their
respective rights to claim entire prize as their own due to lottery’s “sole claimant”
rule, and their agreement to share equally the related tax liabilities); Stepp v.
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ing from the legal purchase of a lottery ticket creates an enforcea-
ble oral615 contract, as many courts have held.616 For example,
where there is sufficient evidence proving the existence of an
enforceable contract to divide lottery winnings, a court may val-
idly affirm a motion for summary judgment in favor of parties who
alleged and proved such a contract.617 Moreover, courts are free to
conclude that pooling resources to purchase lottery tickets legally
in a lottery state presumes the existence of an agreement to dis-
tribute the proceeds from a winning, legal lottery ticket between
such parties.618
A Georgia Supreme Court case, Talley v. Mathis,619 is helpful
in this regard. In Talley, two Georgia residents agreed that the
defendant’s daughter, who lived in Kentucky, would buy lottery
tickets for the two Georgia residents with money provided by each
Freeman, 694 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an informal group
in which coworkers pooled their resources to purchase lottery tickets when jackpot
reached $8 million had entered implied contract that member would not be dropped
from group unless he expressed intent to leave group to organizer or organizer
dropped him from group for failure to pay, which was breached when organizer
unilaterally dropped coworker from group after they had unrelated personal dispute);
Domingo v. Mitchell, 257 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that coworker’s
agreement to advance another coworker’s share of a group payment for lottery tickets,
and the coworker’s agreement to reimburse her, was an exchange of promises that
was sufficient for consideration to create a binding contract).
615. In circumstances where parties choose instead to put their agreement in
writing, such agreements arguably qualify as enforceable written contracts as well.
616. See cases discussed in note 614.
617. See, e.g., Maffea v. Ippolito, 247 A.D.2d 366, 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding
enforceable alleged oral agreement made at informal family gathering to share grand
prize in state lottery if either party won despite absence of evidence that party who
eventually did win lottery assented to agreement at time of gathering or any time
subsequent thereto); Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262, 270 (N.D. 2001) (holding
that couple who won Canadian lottery did not convert the property of former friends
who alleged they had contract with winters to share in lottery proceeds, where parties
did not pool their money to purchase winning lottery ticket jointly, but allegedly
exchanged promises to share any winnings from their individually owned lottery
tickets).
618. See Cahn v. Kensler, 34 F. 472, 473 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1888) (holding that a joint
purchase of two lottery tickets with funds equally contributed by both parties was
determinative of the claimant’s recovery of a one-half share of the proceeds delivered
by the lottery company to the recipient, thus arguably presuming that an agreement
to equally divide the winnings was formed under such circumstances); see also
Lomberk v. Lenox, 1989 WL 817148 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1989) (holding that in any situation
where the purchaser of lottery tickets is given a sum of money by another, and several
tickets are purchased with both of the parties’ money, the proceeds from any winning
ticket must be divided in the same proportion as the contribution by each party to the
total amount spent on the tickets by the purchaser on that date, unless there is an
express contract or agreement that all winnings are to be retained by the purchaser).
619. 453 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 1995).
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of them.620 When a ticket the defendant’s daughter purchased won
a six million dollar prize in the Kentucky lottery, the defendant
told the plaintiff that the ticket belonged to his daughter and
others, not to the plaintiff.621 Plaintiff filed suit against the other
Georgia resident, the Georgia resident’s daughter, and others.622
The superior court held that the agreement between the par-
ties violated Georgia’s public policy and granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss.623 Although the decision was affirmed on
appeal,624 the Georgia Supreme Court ultimately reversed.625
Concluding that a contract to purchase the winning ticket
was validly made in Kentucky, the court enforced the agreement
at issue.626 The court declared that a contract was made between
the actual purchaser on the one hand and the State of Kentucky
on the other.627 Moreover, the court ruled that the contract was
perfectly legal in Kentucky628 because such contracts were per-
fectly legal for persons to enter into in the State of Kentucky.629
In its analysis, the court first quoted the Georgia anti-gam-
bling statute, which made gambling agreements void.630 However,
the court noted that the parties’ bargain did not involve a situa-
tion where one of the parties had to lose—a hallmark of gambling
agreements.631 The only gambling contract that conceivably
existed, the court concluded, was between the state of Kentucky
and the holder of the winning ticket.632 Because the state of Ken-
620. Id. at 705–706.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. See Talley v. Mathis, 441 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 457
S.E.2d 715 (Ga. App. Ct. 1995). Since the agreement in controversy was allegedly
made in 1991 and the pertinent lottery tickets were purchased in March 1992, the
court of appeals rebuffed plaintiff’s argument that a constitutional amendment
authorizing a Georgia state lottery and passed in 1992, had indicated a modification
of Georgia’s public policy. Id. The court of appeals did not find plaintiff’s argument
persuasive because the constitutional amendment was enacted subsequent to the
lottery-ticket purchase and the amendment did not specifically mandate any
retroactive effect. Id. The court of appeals therefore concluded that the constitutional
amendment was prospective only. The Supreme Court of Georgia did not discuss the
legal impact of the Georgia lottery-authorization amendment.
624. Talley, 441 S.E.2d at 856.
625. Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 706.
626. Id. (“Under those circumstances, appellant was merely using appellees as his
agents for engaging in the lawful act of gambling in Kentucky.”).




631. Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 705.
632. Id.
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tucky was not a party to the suit, and because the state agreed to
pay the holder of the winning ticket, the agreement was enforcea-
ble in Kentucky.633 This meant that both lower courts erred in
relying on the Georgia anti-gambling statute to nullify the parties’
agreement.634
Secondly, the court acknowledged that the agreement was
indeed legally vulnerable to nullification if it were immoral, ille-
gal, or otherwise in violation of the public policy of Georgia.635
However, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties had not
made any illegal agreement or agreements in Georgia to purchase
a Kentucky lottery ticket.636 On the contrary, playing the Ken-
tucky lottery by purchasing lottery tickets in Kentucky was
entirely lawful and there was no proof that there was any conduct
or facts that violated Georgia law or public policy.637
Rather, there was proof that the ticket had been lawfully pur-
chased in Kentucky.638 On the facts presented, the two Georgia
residents had simply arranged for a Kentucky resident, as an
agent, to do an act that was entirely lawful under the laws of Ken-
tucky.639 The Supreme Court of Georgia reasoned that there would
have been nothing illegal for a Georgia resident to personally
travel to Kentucky and buy a lottery ticket there.640 The Supreme
Court of Georgia therefore concluded that the two Georgia
residents had merely pooled money for the joint purchase641 of a
Kentucky lottery ticket, by a third party who lived in Kentucky.642
The Supreme Court of Georgia cited a similar Indiana case
where the Indiana courts had upheld the legality of a factually
similar agreement.643 In the Indiana case, two Indiana residents
agreed that one of them would travel to Illinois and purchase lot-
tery tickets in Illinois for the first party.644 Since the purchase of




636. Id. (“[Plaintiff] did not contract with [defendants] for the illegal purchase in
Georgia of the Kentucky lottery ticket.”).




641. Id. The court also found that this happened in Kentucky.
642. Id.
643. See Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1987).
644. Id.
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the agreement was not unlawful.645
The Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized the point that a
refusal to permit suit to enforce the agreement would not benefit
the citizens of Georgia.646 On the contrary, a refusal by the
Supreme Court of Georgia to reverse dismissal of the suit to
enforce the agreement would irrefutably reward duplicitous con-
duct on the part of the alleged bargain-violator.647 Therefore court
interpretation of breach of the agreement as lawful behavior
would unquestionably violate Georgia’s public policy.648 In revers-
ing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of
Georgia permitted plaintiff to lawfully seek recovery of a share of
the proceeds of the winning ticket in a lottery sponsored by the
State of Kentucky.649
[iv] Future of the Lottery-Proliferation Phenomenon as a
Voluntary and “Painless Tax”
In both the Commonwealth Caribbean and the U.S., lotteries
have proliferated in the last half a century or so. Moreover, they
have proven to be genuinely successful as a tax-substitute mecha-
nism. They are certainly voluntary, although being “painless” may
be a matter of individual opinion. Nevertheless, notwithstanding
the apparent perception650 of lotteries as a “voluntary and painless
tax,” they will continue to be subjected to the relentless judicial
scrutiny that the courts have conducted as the need has arisen in
the past. Moreover, the individual state sovereignty, of lottery
states on the one hand and of non-lottery states on the other, will
continue to propel antithetical decisions by state courts in lottery-
controversies arising in the individual states in the U.S.
The growing governmental reliance on lottery revenue in lieu
of involuntary taxes may not be a panacea at all. The current
financial prosperity and widespread state embrace of lotteries in
the U.S. and the Commonwealth Caribbean may lull both the elec-
torate and its political representatives into overlooking the invisi-
ble hand of subconscious and potentially treacherous
645. Id.




650. The term “perception” is used here to refer generally to state legislatures
throughout the United States and also by legislatures throughout the Commonwealth
Caribbean territories.
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psychological undercurrents.651 The future may be exhilarating or
ominous and every state needs to remember the pendulum nature
of lotteries in U.S. legal history.652 The public view of gambling
and lotteries in particular can reverse itself, so, states must
remain wary and remember that it is often calm just before a
storm.653
XII. CONCLUSION
Resignation to the purpose of lotteries as tax-substitute vehi-
cles seems widespread and enduring in both the Commonwealth
Caribbean and the U.S. Indeed, governmental revenue needs—in
both instances—are colossal and will fuel perpetuation and
expansion of lotteries in both for the foreseeable future. In this
regard, the insuperable uncertainty of the future may be good rea-
son to pause and reflect.654 Of course, in the U.S., the NGISC
report noted that, with two exceptions655 “[t]he Commission recom-
mends to state governments and the federal government that
states are best equipped to regulate gambling within their own
borders . . . .”656
This conclusion may reflect the Commission’s acknowledg-
ment of the legal supremacy of the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution in the context of each state’s exercise of its “police
powers.”657 The Commission’s conclusion may also be based upon
its confidence and faith in the resilience and genius of the common
law and in particular the judiciary’s effective management of each
state’s public policy.658
651. See HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 121 (“The expectations and beliefs of the
participants in gambling policy are continually shaped by both the history and the
evolution of gambling.  Gambling continues to experience the consequences of its
nineteenth and early twentieth century history of corruption and scandal.”)
(emphasis added).
652. See supra Section VI. A; see, e.g., HERRMANN, supra note 77, at 121 (“Gambling
policy can be seen as responsive to mass public opinion, when one defines
responsiveness in terms of policy adoption in which a majority expresses support. As
the public’s view of gambling has softened, the prevalence and availability of
gambling have increased.”).
653. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 129 (“[W]hen times [are] quiet . . . they
could change.”).
654. See id. (“[It] is a common failing of mankind, never to anticipate a storm when
the sea is calm.”).
655. See NGISC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at Ch. 3, 3–1 (The two exceptions
are tribal gambling and internet gambling.).
656. Id. (emphasis added).
657. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 180.
658. See, e.g., Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 2001) (granting
summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for enforcement of
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The implications of this conclusion by the NGISC are that any
radical changes in the law relating to public policy and lotteries in
the U.S. would be wishful thinking. This prospect of “steady as
she goes” stability may very well be a good prospect for the future.
Moreover, the Commonwealth Caribbean’s future decisions-profile
relating to agreements implicating lotteries, will, in all likelihood,
emulate the U.S.’ lottery law jurisprudence.
Therefore, the future resolution of lottery controversies may
be best left in the capable hands of the judiciary in light of the
exemplary track record of excellence that the entire history of case
resolution in the U.S. has confirmed. This is the case because the
societal value to be derived from the ameliorative power of public
policy in the hands of the judiciary in both the Commonwealth
Caribbean and in the U.S. is irrefutable. The interpretation of lot-
tery law and the application of public policy to lottery controver-
sies must remain central to the judicial function in these two
clusters of common law jurisdictions. This is an enduring dimen-
sion of the judiciary’s prowess in exercising public policy’s delicate
and potent power with integrity and consummate skill. It should
continue.659
an alleged contract to share lottery proceeds); Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 28
N.E.2d 207 (Oh. Ct. App. 1940) (refusing to grant injunction where petitioner sought
to restrain parties from interfering with petitioner’s ‘bank night’ lottery operation.);
see also Barquin v. Flores, 459 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[E]ven
though the gambling proceeds he sought to recover derived from a Puerto Rican
lottery ticket lawfully purchased by a Puerto Rican resident in Puerto Rico,” the court
dismissed the complaint because it sought to enforce a gambling obligation.);
Mexican International Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein, 37 P. 574, 576 (Utah 1894) (“[This
court will not] sit to take an account between two thieves from San Francisco . . .  that
is what we are asked to do here.”).
659. See Brachtenbach, supra note 30, at 19.
